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Executive summary  
The main objective of this report is to inform key decision-makers of Norwegian development 
assistance on the development prospects of the commercial energy sector in Bangladesh.  
 
Gas is currently the only indigenous non-renewable energy resource in the country that is 
produced and consumed in significant quantities. Gas constitutes approximately 70% of the 
commercial energy use in Bangladesh. 
 
Most of the population remains without access to commercial energy for lighting and 
cooking, but depends primarily on biomass. Thus, the main challenge before the country is 
how to provide electricity to domestic industry and households and to broaden access to 
natural gas. This review critically examines the gas and power sectors in terms of major 
actors, current and potential output, generation, transmission and distribution problems and 
the emerging policy regime. 
 
This summary is structured along the lines of the main report, whose concluding section 
presents a synopsis. 
 
The regional energy market 
Bangladesh and its surrounding areas are thought to be rich in energy resources. In the 
medium term, demand for power in India and Bangladesh is set to grow quickly.  
 
Three countries (India, Nepal and Bhutan) are likely to be the most relevant for Bangladesh in 
the development of a regional energy strategy. Nepal and Bhutan are endowed with 
considerable hydroelectric potential. India is looking for ways to augment its sources of 
energy and is eyeing Bangladeshi gas with interest. 
 
The economic and technical advantages of a regional electricity and gas grid/pipeline are 
many. It would ensure a greater supply security and reliability, reduce the reserves needed for 
meeting peak demands, lower costs through economies of scale, increase the diversification of 
primary sources of energy and contribute to overall efficiency.  
 
Necessary first steps include the development of an adequate database on regional energy 
supply-demand, especially demand for power; an examination of development options facing 
each country and the region as a whole, regulatory policy and price-subsidy practices; and an 
estimation of gains from regional energy trade. Simultaneously, political irritants have to be 
removed before real commitment can be generated for cooperation. 
 
Energy policy of Bangladesh (NEP) 
NEP is quite ambitious and farsighted regarding objectives and strategies for the reform 
process, particularly in the power sector. The need for a reform and strategies for 
implementing it are also underscored in the Fifth Five-Year Plan and through the ADP. 
 
Major bottlenecks are identified and strategies are developed. These strategies are similar to 
those put forward by the donor community: 
  
· Separation of sector regulation and operation through a regulatory body 
· Autonomy and commercial orientation of the sector entities 
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· Unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution 
· Increased private sector participation 
 
What distinguishes the GoB policy from the donor policy is the time frame of the reform 
process. International financial institutions such as WB and ADB are not only impatient with 
the reform process, but very disappointed with the past performance of the energy sector. All 
new projects are therefore linked to the reform process.  
 
Gas sector 
Gas production is concentrated in the hands of four suppliers: two international oil companies 
and two national companies. The international oil companies produce a quarter of total 
production. Shell produces 16% of the total while Unocal accounts for the remaining 9%. The 
rest is produced by two Petrobangla firms. Total production has on average increased by 7.1% 
per year during the last decade and daily production is 900 million cubic feet.  
 
Arrangements with international oil companies are regulated through production sharing 
agreements. The IOCs cover all costs of exploration and production. When production of gas 
starts, the cost is reimbursed based on an agreed share of maximum cost oil. The IOCs do not 
pay any taxes.  
 
The gas market is highly concentrated in production, transmission and distribution and the 
government lacks a regional perspective on the development of the gas sector. 
 
The market is not viable in the sense that gas prices do not cover the cost of production. For 
instance, contracts with IOCs are based on a ‘take or pay’ principle where the price 
Petrobangla pays to the IOC is higher than its (regulated) selling price. The example 
illustrates the importance of liberalising distribution along with production (but not with 
transmission, since it is a natural monopoly). 
 
GoB has a static view on reserves. Petrobangla lacks financial resources to undertake drilling 
activities while the IOCs are reluctant because they are unsure about the effective market 
demand for the gas. With activities limited, one can hardly discover new reserves. 
 
Power sector 
The power sector in Bangladesh is beset with huge management and institutional problems. 
The main agency in charge of power is the BPDB (Bangladesh Power Development Board). 
Over the years BPDB agreed to undertake reforms, e.g. formation of a separate distribution 
company (DESA) for power distribution in Dhaka, creation of DESCO in 1996 as a 
subsidiary of DESA, and setting up the Power Grid Company (PGCB) in 1996 to operate and 
maintain the transmission system. The reforms have been taking place slowly, mainly to meet 
donor conditionalities. 
 
Power production is mainly based on the transformation of natural gas. BPDB is the main 
producer of electricity, but production is inefficient. Generators are mainly based on old 
vintage technology, while proper maintenance is not undertaken. Lack of available reserve 
capacity has meant that frequently generators cannot be shut down for much needed repair-
maintenance work. The problem is compounded by the difficult financial situation of BPDB.  
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Extensive load shedding, system loss and low collection ratios underscore these problems. 
Like the gas sector, the power sector is not viable with the current price structure, since prices 
do not cover costs. 
 
In the future IPPs will play an even more important role as producers of power (on a ‘take or 
pay’ basis), leading the GoB into financial difficulties without reforming the sector.  
 
Energy and poverty alleviation 
A big challenge facing countries like Bangladesh where access is limited is to provide 
connections to households and to ensure that the poor are not left out of this process.  
 
In the case of power, some progress has been made under the REB, which has expanded 
rapidly in recent years. In the case of urban areas, power to poor households is constrained by 
the fact that most tend to live in squatter slums and do not have legal title to their premises.  
 
 
The demand for power remains huge and largely unmet. The financial cost of connections and 
monthly bills are such that even the rural poor can afford these easily. Compared to their 
urban counterparts or neighbors in India, rural Bangladeshi consumers receive fewer 
subsidies, pay their bills more promptly and engage in less pilferage. 
 
The REB’s institutional structure seems efficient and accountable and has demonstrated good 
capacity for rapid expansion and recovery of dues.  
 
Gas connections for domestic and industrial use are mainly provided to consumers in urban-
industrial concentrations. Given the large infrastructural outlays involved in transporting gas, 
it is generally considered not economically viable to take pipelines to rural areas. 
 
The political economy of energy policy 
The implementation of reforms has been slow because of stiff resistance from the 
bureaucracy, the officials of the concerned agencies (e.g. Petrobangla and PDB) and their 
trade unions.  
 
Civil society and the political parties are not very vocal about the question of reforms. There 
remains a great deal of concern about the presence of powerful IOCs in the country and 
whether Bangladesh is able to safeguard its national interests and ensure negotiation of an 
equitable and fair contract. 
  
The power sector has been opened to foreign independent power producers in order to 
accelerate power generation capacity in the country. Investor response has been excellent. 
There is a concern regarding the country's ability to muster the necessary foreign currency 
resources that will be needed to pay the IPPs. 
 
The state of inaction receives support from a host of vested interest groups that stand to gain - 
trade union leaders and their members, officials of BPDB (and subsidiaries) and a large 
network of contractors, engineers, suppliers and cadres of political parties. It is likely that 
corporatization, combined with an appropriate incentive and management structure, can 
rescue public sector agencies like BPDB.  
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There is increasing support in Bangladesh for an export-oriented growth strategy to generate 
employment and improve access to technology and foreign investment. An important sector 
in this context is foreign investment in and possible exports of natural gas. At the same time, 
there is a distinct reluctance/conservatism with regard to gas exports from Bangladesh. 
 
A frequent question raised refers to the reliability of the estimate of gas reserves. There is a 
feeling that the government has inadequate information and should take steps to develop its 
own capability to enable it to make independent assessments of the reserve position. Other 
concerns flagged include: the assessment of domestic energy requirements; inadequate 
discussion and dissemination of information; and lack of a strategic plan in terms of 
alternative options for gas use. 
 
A number of distinct views emerged about the desirability of exports: that exports may only 
be undertaken after ensuring that the country is able to meet domestic gas demand for the next 
fifty years; that limited exports be allowed to bordering regions of India; or that substantial 
gas exports be permitted by pipeline to India, mainly to the New Delhi market. Most 
opposition political parties are opposed to exports through a pipeline, while some foreign and 
local academics advocate a five-year moratorium on exports. Exports after value-addition is 
much less controversial, so that a serious effort needs to be made to examine the option of e.g. 
gas-based power exports. There is a feeling that Bangladesh may be forced into a situation 
where there is no option but to export - if only to pay the IOCs for gas off-takes. There is 
increasing pressure from powerful quarters to that end. 
  
There are also political-strategic considerations that may be important. This has to do with 
broader Indo-Bangla relations, including the resolution of outstanding border disputes, access 
to Indian markets for Bangladeshi products, and fears of Indian domination.  
 
A major concern relates to PSAs and the relationship between the IOCs and their local agents. 
Many expressed an apprehension that perhaps these contracts are being signed in haste and in 
a situation of inadequate transparency.  
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS 
(as of May 2001) 
Currency Unit = Taka (Tk) 
US$1.00 = Tk 55 
 
FISCAL YEAR 
1 July –30 June 30  
 
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 
 
MCF =  thousand standard cubic feet 
MMCFD =  million standard cubic feet per day 
BCF =  billion cubic feet 
TCF =  trillion cubic feet (1,000 billion) cubic feet 
kW  =  kilowatt 
MW =  megawatt (one thousand kilowatts) 
KGOE  = kilogram of oil equivalent 
kWh =  kilowatt-hour 
GWh =  Gigawatt-hour 
kV =  kilovolt 
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
ADB =  Asian Development Bank 
ADP = Annual Development Programme 
BAPEX =  Bangladesh Petroleum Exploration Company 
BPDB =  Bangladesh Power Development Board 
BIDS = Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies 
CPD = Centre for Policy Dialogue 
CMI = Chr. Michelsen Institute 
DESA =  Dhaka Electricity Supply Authority 
DESCO =  Dhaka Electricity Supply Company 
GoB =  Government of Bangladesh 
GDP = Gross domestic product 
GTCL = Gas Transmission Company Ltd. 
HCU =  Hydrocarbon Unit 
IOC =  International Oil Company 
IPP =  Independent Power Producer 
LGED = Local Government Engineering Department 
LPG = Liquified Nitrogen Gas 
LNG = Liquefied Natural Gas 
LRMC =  Long-run Marginal Cost 
MEMR =  Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 
NCG = Nordic Consulting Group 
NEP = National Energy Policy of Bangladesh 
NR = National Resources 
PC =  Power Cell 
PGCB =  Power Grid Company of Bangladesh 
PSA =  Production Sharing Agreement 
Plan = Fifth Five Year Plan 1997-2002 
RPC = Regional Power Companies 
PBS =  Palli Bidyut Samity (Rural Electrification Cooperative) 
RE = Rural electrification 
REB =  Rural Electrification Board 
ROM =  Rehabilitate Operate Maintenance 
WB = World Bank 
TOR = Terms of Reference 
SAARC = South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation 
UAE = United Arab Emirates 
USGS = US Geological Survey 
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1. Introduction and background 
The main objective of this report is to inform key decision-makers on Norwegian 
development assistance of the development prospects of the commercial energy sector in 
Bangladesh.1 According to the TOR (see Annex 1a), the report should provide a review of the 
energy sector and discuss emerging policy challenges in order to promote optimal utilization 
of resources, maximize economic growth and reduce poverty. 2 
 
Energy consumption in Bangladesh constitutes only 0.1 per cent of total world energy 
consumption. Consumption of commercial energy makes up about half of total energy 
consumption, somewhat less than other South Asian countries, but its absolute level is very 
low even in comparison with the low South Asian standard (see Annex 2). The two most 
important energy-intensive sectors are transport and industry, accounting for around 50% and 
43% of total commercial energy use in the country (EIA, 2001a). Before the discovery of 
significant quantities of natural gas, energy supply depended on limited domestic hydro-
electricity and coal or fuel-driven power generation based on imports. Gas is currently the 
only indigenous non-renewable energy resource in the country that is produced and consumed 
in significant quantities.3 
 
Investments in the energy sector constitute a crucial part of a country's infrastructure. For 
developing countries, the income elasticity of energy is greater than one.4 Unless energy 
supplies increase more rapidly than income growth, economic growth could therefore be 
adversely affected. A well functioning energy sector not only facilitates productive 
investment in the sector itself (through public investment, foreign aid and FDI), but also 
facilitates investment in other sectors. The gas and power sector account for most of the 
foreign investments that have taken place in Bangladesh during recent years.5 Without 
appropriate investments in the energy sector, other sectors often suffer. In 1999, Bangladesh 
experienced only 30 days of uninterrupted power supply. WB estimates that load shedding 
represents about 0.5 percent loss in GDP and US$ 1 billion loss in terms of industrial output 
per year. In particular, the garment export sector of Bangladesh has experienced severe energy 
problems and has therefore had to invest heavily in spare power aggregates. Power shortages 
can also have serious social consequences, as observed in the form of violent demonstrations 
in Dhaka. 
 
Energy accounts for an important part of GoB expenditure, even more than expenditure on 
health and family planning. Similarly, donors have spent more than 1 billion USD in the 
power sector. The outcome of these investments has not always been in accordance with the 
resources applied, and current aid programmes are generally linked to a reform process.  
 
                                                   
1 This study was commissioned with reference to a contract entered with CMI/NCG on 22.4.1999 specifying the 
objectives of a 2-year programme for strengthening the country-specific knowledge base of NORAD and the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The authors undertook fieldwork in Bangladesh during March/April 
2001. A list of persons interviewed is provided in Annex 1b. 
2 An analysis of non-commercial energy consumption (wood, animal waste and crop residues) is outside the 
scope of this paper. 
3 A small quantity of coal deposits have been found in Barapukuria, in the north and is being currently developed 
with Chinese assistance. The coal quality is reported to be better than the imported Indian coal. 
4 A recent study of Asian countries found it to be 1.3 (see Pesaran et al, 1998). An income growth of one percent 
will therefore increase energy demand by 1.3 percent. 
5 See World Bank (1999). 
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Most of the population remains without access to commercial energy for lighting and 
cooking, and depends primarily on biomass. Thus, the main challenge before the country is 
how to provide electricity to domestic industry and households and to broaden access to 
natural gas. This review critically examines the gas and power sectors in terms of major 
actors, current and potential output, generation, transmission and distribution problems and 
the emerging policy regime.  
 
Sets of concerns that underpin the more techno-economic debates surrounding the sector 
relate to political economic considerations, especially in relation to gas exports and regional 
co-operation. An increasing concern relates to how energy sector developments connect with 
poverty alleviation and the worry that the poor could be bypassed. On the domestic front, 
there are serious fears that without clear, transparent governance procedures and 
independence for relevant agencies/ministries, the country's scarce energy resources may be 
squandered or misappropriated. This fear has been underscored by public power utilities 
facing financial distress.  
 
Reforms are clearly urgently needed, although progress has been slow despite quite intense 
donor pressure. The discussion in this review points to a complex political economy with 
strong vested interests. Political economy questions are not static, with new actors such as 
IPPs and IOCs assuming a prominent role in the energy sector. In addition to donor pressure, 
the GoB faces pressure to reform from the market itself. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section two provides background information on the 
regional energy market and the potential for regional co-operation. Section three discusses 
energy policy in Bangladesh as revealed by core policy documents and public expenditure 
data. Sections four and five give an overview of the gas and power sectors respectively. With 
this background the two following sections discuss the energy poverty linkages and factors 
contributing to slow implementation of the reform process. The final section concludes this 
review. 
2. The regional energy market 
Bangladesh is strategically located in between two great geo-economic areas, namely South 
and South-East Asia, bordering India to the north, west and north-east, Myanmar to the east 
and the Bay of Bengal to the south. The Bangladesh landmass also almost entirely separates 
off the north-eastern Indian states (the Seven Sisters) from the rest of India, save for a narrow 
strip of land over which a long and precarious road and rail link is maintained.  
 
Apart from its strategic location, Bangladesh and its surrounding areas are thought to be rich 
in energy resources, which remain largely untapped and unexplored. Bangladesh’s own gas 
reserves appear to be sizeable and have generated considerable interest amongst the large 
international oil companies. North-east India and Myanmar are well endowed with gas, in 
addition to possessing significant oil reserves. Neighbouring Nepal and Bhutan also enjoy a 
huge, largely untapped hydro-electricity potential.  
 
The South Asian economies (especially India and Bangladesh) have been experiencing good 
rates of growth in recent years, at around 5-7 percent. The huge Indian economy has opened 
gradually to foreign investment. The demand for commercial energy and power has increased 
rapidly, leading to large emerging shortages manifested in frequent power outages. Demand 
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in Bangladesh is also set to rise quickly (at 6-8 percent), although from a much lower base.6 
Thus, in the medium term demand for power in India is likely to rise quickly and the country 
will need to evolve a policy strategy to ensure adequate supplies. Bangladesh is also 
concerned about its longer run energy security and may need to look beyond its borders to 
achieve a sensible and optimal energy strategy.  
 
Economic and population growth has led to rapid increases in commercial energy 
consumption in South Asia, well above the OECD rate. It has been observed that energy 
consumption has increased by 50 percent in the region during the 1990s. Different estimates 
exist for future energy consumption levels. One estimate suggests that per capita consumption 
of energy will double from 1994 to 2004 (Pesaran et al 1998:168). 
 
South Asia accounted for 3.4 percent of world commercial energy consumption in 1999 (up 
from 2.4 percent in 1987). However, per capita consumption remains one of the lowest in the 
world.  
 
South Asia’s commercial energy mix in 1999 was as follows: coal (43%), petroleum (35%), 
natural gas (13%), hydroelectricity (8%), and nuclear (1%). The commercial energy mix in 
Bangladesh is much less diversified with a preponderant dependence on natural gas (71% in 
1999), while India depends primarily on coal (51%).7 During the 1990s, commercial energy 
consumption in Bangladesh has increased on average by 7.8% per year. 
 
A recent study highlights the low consumption levels in South Asia through a cross-country 
regression explaining energy consumption in terms of GDP per capita. It notes that the 
position of the South Asian countries is far below the level that would be expected for 
countries at their particular level of GDP per capita, suggesting a huge unmet energy demand 
(or a supply constraint) in operation.8  
 
South Asian consumption per capita is estimated at 443 kgoe, with India having the highest 
consumption at 479 kgoe and Bangladesh the lowest (at 197 kgoe - refer to Annex 2). In 
general, Bangladeshi consumption and production of commercial energy is low even 
compared to the low South Asian regional standards. Thus, per capita electricity consumption 
in Bangladesh is a paltry 73 KWh, compared to around 423 and 319 kWh for India and 
Pakistan and 600kWh for Bhutan. The energy intensity (MTOE/GDP) is also extremely low 
in Bangladesh (see Annex 2 and Pesaran et al. 1998). The low energy intensities reflect a 
widespread use of traditional biomass by the rural population and an underdeveloped 
industrial structure.  
2.1 Potential for regional co-operation 
There are significant complementarities in the energy sector amongst the countries of the 
region. Energy endowments include coal (mainly India), gas (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) 
and hydropower (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Nepal). There are no 
technical or economic reasons to prevent the development of bilateral or regional agreements 
to utilise these resources more efficiently and contribute towards the creation of a regional 
energy hub or an economic growth zone (Sobhan, 1999). 
                                                   
6 Energy demand in Bangladesh and India is estimated to increase by 8.5% and 6.5% per year respectively 
according to a study by Pesaran et al (1998:167). 
7 EIA (2001b). 
8 Wickramasinghe (2001)  
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The economic and technical advantages of a regional electricity and gas grid/pipeline are 
many. It ensures greater supply security and reliability, reduces the reserves needed for 
meeting peak demands, lowers costs through economies of scale (transmission is a natural 
monopoly), increases diversification of primary sources of energy and contributes to overall 
efficiency. The formation of a SAARC committee (Technical Committee on Energy) is a 
small step in the right direction. The prospect of an inter-regional electricity grid has also 
been put on SAARC's agenda. 
 
In Asia, electricity trade occurs between a few interconnected countries. Interconnections 
exist between Thailand and Laos, Indonesia and Singapore, Vietnam and Laos, and China and 
Hong Kong, while it has been considered between Thailand and Malaysia.9 An ASEAN 
electricity grid has also been discussed.  
 
Saha (1998) has identified five types of inter-related barriers that constrain regional co-
operation in energy: policy barriers, technical barriers, institutional barriers, commercial 
barriers and financial barriers. We would introduce one other - a political barrier - which in 
fact may prove to be the most intractable. The main policy barrier is the concept of self-
sufficiency espoused by each country and the use of different technical standards and 
specifications that make co-ordination difficult. Energy authority officials in these countries 
rarely meet to co-ordinate policy or design standards. The large financial resources required 
need not impose a binding constraint as long as markets are identified and firm contracts and 
guarantees against risk are provided to domestic and foreign investors. Fundamentally, 
however, there remains considerable distrust  and sensitivities amongst the countries of the 
region, which must first be overcome. The largest country, India, probably needs to assume a 
critical responsibility in this matter. Thus necessary first steps include the development of an 
adequate database on regional energy supply-demand, especially demand for power; an 
examination of development options facing each country and the region as a whole, 
regulatory policy and pricing-subsidy practices; and an estimation of gains from regional 
energy trade. Simultaneously, political irritants have to be removed before real commitment 
can be generated for co-operation.10 
2.1.1 Regional supply-demand potential: India, Nepal and Bhutan 
These three countries are likely to be the most relevant for Bangladesh in its endeavour to 
chalk out a regional energy strategy. Nepal and Bhutan are endowed with considerable 
hydroelectric potential and could compete with Bangladesh in the regional export market for 
power. Alternatively, cheap power imports from these countries may be something that 
Bangladesh will need to consider actively in the long term. India, on the other hand, is 
looking to augment its sources of energy and is eyeing Bangladeshi gas along with possible 
pipeline gas from Iran (via Pakistan) and LNG from the UAE. As far as Bangladesh is 
concerned, India represents a potential market for power and gas. Thus, commercial energy 
demand scenarios in India need to be carefully analysed by Bangladeshi policy makers. 
Similarly, Bangladesh also needs to focus on potentially energy-rich Nepal and Bhutan to 
explore the potential for a regional approach to energy security. 
                                                   
9 WTO (1998:9). 
10 Frequent "minor" skirmishes along the 4000 km Indo-Bangla border tend to accentuate the feeling of mistrust 
and are potentially costly in terms of preventing cooperation. The recent border clash on 14 April 2001, which 
left 19 border guards dead in both countries, serves to underline this concern. 
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2.1.2  Indian energy demand: A window of opportunity? 
Indian power generation capacity has registered dramatic growth over the years - from 5700 
MW in 1950 to over 100000 MW today. Underlying this growth, however, there are a 
complex array of problems from which the sector continues to suffer: a huge power shortage, 
high pilferage rates,11 low metering, unequal access, low reliability of supplies and frequent 
power cuts, financial losses and high subsidy levels. Steps are gradually being taken to 
address these problems, including strategies for institutional and "functional" reforms, setting 
up an independent regulatory body and conducting energy auditing. The hitherto 
"untouchable" question of agricultural subsidies to farmers is increasingly being discussed. 
 
India faces an acute power crisis with current generation being 30 percent below demand,12 
requiring heavy investment in generation capacity. The Indian government has targeted 
additional capacity investments in the order of 40000 MW over 1997-2002 and forecasts 
additional needs of 111500 MW by 2007. Overall Indian power demand is projected to 
increase to 1192 billion kWh in 2020 (i.e. three times the level of 1996).  
 
India generates around 70 percent of power from coal-fired plants, 20 percent from 
hydroelectric plants and the rest from natural gas, oil and nuclear sources. It is gradually 
increasing its use of natural gas (both LNG and piped gas) and the scale of future power 
demand bodes well for a strong gas/power market in India. Should Bangladesh decide to 
export piped gas, the Indian market holds definite promise. It is being argued by IOCs and 
other observers that this is a constrained "window of opportunity" that should not be taken for 
granted.13 
 
The main arguments put forward in support of the “limited window of opportunity” 
hypothesis include the possibility of significant gas discoveries in India itself (especially in 
the Godavari basin) over the next 5-7 years, piped gas from Iran or Central Asia via Pakistan 
(if the tense political relations with Pakistan can be improved) and LNG from the Middle 
East. India will have to find some solution to its energy problem, the argument goes, and once 
it locks itself into a long-term gas/energy contract with another party, this opportunity will 
vanish forever. Let us briefly review these options: 
 
At this point in time a meaningful and lasting rapprochement with Pakistan appears unlikely. 
The last thing India would consider is depending on crucial energy sources via a pipeline that 
cuts across Pakistan. 
 
The potential for significant discoveries of natural gas always exists. However, even if 
explorations were to begin now, actual discovery and development of new fields, and setting 
up transmission and distribution systems, means that the actual availability of gas would take 
a minimum of 6-8 years. This particular type of threat, therefore, is not of immediate 
relevance, giving Bangladesh sufficient time to make up its mind about exports.14  
 
Cheaply produced LNG is available from the Middle East, but this is mainly a viable option 
in areas close to the coast rather than at points deeper inland. Thus, a solution would still have 
                                                   
11 For example, transmission and distribution losses in Delhi are estimated at 50 percent. 
12 EIA (March 2000) South Asia Regional, www.eia.doe.gov. 
13 See Wood Mackenzie (2000). 
14 See Wood Mackenzie (2000). 
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to be found to meet the energy demand from major urban-industrial configurations (e.g. the 
Delhi area).  
 
Possible export options for Bangladesh include conversion to power for export, or pipeline 
exports of gas for ultimate conversion to power or fertiliser. There may also be some demand 
from Indian fertiliser plants, which are reportedly paying a high price for their input supplies. 
The option of conversion to LNG has been quite thoroughly appraised and found sub-optimal. 
Whether power exports are a good, cost-effective option does not appear to have been 
adequately investigated. A technical feasibility study undertaken suggests that this is feasible 
since the Eastern grid in India (where initial exports would have to be made) is well under 
way towards being connected up with the Western and Northern grids, where these exports 
would ultimately need to be channelled. In other words, the Indian electricity grids are 
undergoing quite significant changes that will give them the ability to move power around 
from one part of the country to another. A detailed economic feasibility study of this option, 
however, remains to be conducted. 
2.1.3 Energy security and the role of Nepal and Bhutan 
Nepal is primarily dependent on hydroelectricity, in which it has a huge potential, as indicated 
by an annual average flow of 225 billion cubic metres. In terms of hydropower potential, 
Nepalese rivers have been graded into three categories, based on their origins. Those 
originating from the Himalayas have the highest potential (Koshi, Narayani, Karnali, 
Mahakali), while those originating in the Mahabharat Range come next (e.g. Mechi, Kankai, 
Kamala, Bagmati). In category 3 are seasonal rivers with the least potential.15 Category 1 and 
2 rivers are thought to have a combined technical potential for generating 83000 MW, of 
which around half is economically feasible. Projected power demand for 2005 is estimated at 
622 MW. A number of projects are under development and mainly aimed for export – around 
18,000 MW. In other words, there remains very significant additional potential left for 
domestic use or further export, including export to Bangladesh. 
 
In the case of Bhutan, the technically feasible hydroelectric potential is around 21000 MW, of 
which only 334 MW are being generated. Steps have been taken to unbundle the electricity 
sector and plans are under way to commission a 1020 MW plant in 2003. This will allow 
Bhutan to undertake additional exports to India. It may be mentioned that the Power Grid 
Corporation of India awarded a contract to a Japanese firm to provide technical consulting 
services for the supply of electricity from Bhutan to New Delhi along a 1116 mile route.16 
Given the far closer proximity to Bangladeshi urban-industrial centres, exports to Bangladesh 
may be economically viable in the long run. 
 
The energy resource base in Myanmar and North-East India is also considerable – a fact that 
Bangladesh will need to keep in mind while formulating its energy development strategy. A 
more enlightened approach may well be to link up with the Myanmar gas pipeline, which 
goes all the way to Thailand – thus providing access to SE Asia. At least one IOC (UNOCAL) 
has long-term plans for joining up its Bangladesh pipeline with its pipeline in Myanmar. 
 
For Bangladesh, the energy export market is in India should it want or need to export in the 
short to medium term. Basically there are two real options, pipeline exports or power exports, 
and these need to be carefully assessed, including the institutional and financial strengths of 
                                                   
15 Wickramasinghe, 2001. 
16 See above. 
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the Indian entities with which long-term contracts will need to be signed. If the benefits are 
about equally distributed between the two options, the latter would be advisable on political 
grounds.17 The critical decision variables for Bangladesh are projections of its own demand 
for power and gas and a good assessment of its reserves. Mention should nevertheless be 
made of the fact that potential Bangladesh demand growth for power and gas may in fact be 
higher than the Indian growth rate, for two reasons: (a) low base levels of consumption as a 
proportion of GDP per capita compared to India, and (b) much lower coverage (25 percent of 
the population connected in Bangladesh compared to 80 percent for India).18 Given 
exhaustible gas resources that could be used up in 20 years (especially if significant exports 
take place), longer-term energy security for the country will involve tying up in addition with 
the energy systems of Nepal and Bhutan. 
3 The energy policy of Bangladesh 
This section provides an overview of the energy policy regime in Bangladesh as revealed by 
core energy policy documents. It first assesses what the GoB says is the real energy policy. It 
will then make an 'expenditure review' by assessing how the government in practice allocates 
funds to the energy sector on the one hand and other public sectors on the other. In this 
section we also provide a brief overview of the main donor activities in the energy sector 
since almost one half of the ADP expenditure in the power and energy sectors is financed by 
project aid.  
 
Our main conclusion is that NEP is quite ambitious and farsighted regarding objectives and 
strategies for the reform process, particularly in the power sector. Major bottlenecks are 
identified and strategies are developed. The need for a reform and strategies for implementing 
it are also underscored in the Fifth Five-Year Plan (Plan) and through the ADP.19 Based on 
stated policy prescriptions, we therefore dispute the claim put forward by donors that the GoB 
has not taken ownership of the reform process. Even so, the actual reform process is slow, 
partly due to the political economy of the reform process. Inherent perceptions by the GoB of 
the stages of the reform process also act as an Achilles' heel, since an independent regulatory 
authority is seen by the GoB as a prerequisite for the reform process. Without such a body, it 
is difficult to separate operation from regulation. At the same time, the GoB is afraid of giving 
up control of such an important sector (see the discussion in section 7.1). Without a 
satisfactory solution to this dilemma, the reform processes will be delayed by postponing the 
creation of an independent unit. Donors are aware of this and underline the importance of 
creating an independent unit, while at the same time they link their project aid to the current 
reform programmes. One weakness with the current energy policy is, however, that it lacks a 
regional perspective. The possibility of regional co-operation is hardly discussed at all. 
3.1 NEP – Reform is necessary 
The current national energy policy in Bangladesh is obtainable in GoB (1995). This document 
also incorporates the petroleum policy as regulated by the Bangladesh Petroleum Act, 1974.20 
                                                   
17 The political hurdles of pipeline exports are far greater than exports after value-addition – see section 7.2. 
18 Power demand in India has been growing at 9% in recent years and that of gas at 7%. GDP per capita in 
Bangladesh and India (at PPP, $) was $1476 and $1800 in 1999 (CIA World Fact Book, 2000). 
19 Some decisions are, however, not farsighted, e.g. in contrast to a recent worldwide trend towards reducing the 
use of nuclear power, the GoB sees the generation of nuclear power as an appropriate option.  
20 We have not analysed Bangladesh’s international energy obligations, apart from the fact that Bangladesh has 
not signed the Kyoto Protocol. 
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In this section, we will give a brief overview of the NEP and present the main targets of the 
energy policy as revealed in the Fifth Five-Year Plan 1997-2002.  
 
There are at least three main objectives in the energy policy: 
· Provide energy for sustainable economic growth; 
· Meet the energy needs of different geographic zones of the country; 
· Ensure sustainable operation of the energy utilities and a rational use of total energy 
sources. 
 
The first objective is linked to the importance played by energy in facilitating economic 
growth. Lack of power may hamper production, trade and economic growth. Although the 
relationship between investment in energy projects and economic growth is unclear, partly 
since the impact depends on how the utilities tackle the maintenance problem, the GoB 
assumes that the energy supply has to increase 50% more than GDP.21 The GoB has, in co-
operation with ADB, made a masterplan for projecting energy demand from different end-
users. Gas demand is derived from the demand in the power sector and in urea production; 
45% -50% of gas is earmarked for power generation, and about 25% for fertilisers. The GoB 
attempts to adjust gas supply to meet the demand from these end-users, in particular that of 
the power sector, to which a high priority is attached. 
 
The second target is a distributional concern, reflecting the fact that nearly all energy in 
Bangladesh is produced in the East zone. The third target emphasises that resources as well as 
institutions must be sustainable and efficient. This has traditionally been a severe problem in 
the power sector (see section 5.5). 
 
The policy paper highlights the importance of reform in the energy sector, particularly the 
power sector. The main elements of a reform process are discussed. For instance, to improve 
management efficiency in public utilities, the policy document argues that production, 
transmission and distribution systems for gaseous fuels and power should be managed as 
separate cost and profit centres where each of the units would be corporatised. Separate profit 
centres are seen as prerequisites for unbundling functional activities such as production, 
transmission and distribution.  
 
The document encourages private sector investment  in the power sector as well as in the 
petroleum industry. It supports incentives for tax exemption, including no duty levied on 
machinery and equipment for energy-related projects.  
 
Regarding prices, the policy document claims that energy prices will be based on economic 
costs, while potential subsidies will be transparent. The introduction of an independent 
regulator (or a National Energy Authority) with the primary objectives of setting standards 
and tariffs, reviewing energy demand and allocating the use of primary energy for different 
end-users is strongly advocated in the policy paper. Both the Electricity Act and the Gas Act, 
which are currently under preparation, seek a clearer specification of the role of the 
independent regulator, one of whose main functions is to separate operating and regulating 
activities.  
                                                   
21 At constant prices, energy demand per capita would grow by 90% more than GDP per capita in Bangladesh 
compared to 20% in the Asian region (Pesaran et al, 1998). The rule of thumb applied in Bangladesh, therefore 
seem reasonable. The same study found that the price elasticity of energy demand was extremely low in 
Bangladesh. Although energy prices are low in Bangladesh, increasing prices as a result of a reform process will 
probably not influence energy demand, but will definitely influence the financial performance of public utilities. 
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3.1.1 The petroleum sector: PSA 
The Bangladesh Petroleum Act authorises the Government through the Bangladesh Oil and 
Gas Corporation (now Petrobangla) to engage in all aspects of petroleum exploration, 
processing, refining and marketing. Agreements with international oil companies are 
regulated through production sharing agreements or contracts (PSA). The IOCs cover all the 
costs of exploration and production. When production of gas starts, the cost is reimbursed 
based on an agreed share of maximum cost oil. The maximum amount of cost oil normally 
constitutes about 55% of gas revenue. If the oil company’s cost in a particular year constitutes 
more than 55% of revenue, it will only be reimbursed the maximum amount in this year. 
Similarly, if it only constitutes 35%, the oil company will be reimbursed 35%. Cost oil is 
generally high during the early production phases. The difference between revenue and 
(reimbursed) cost oil is termed profit oil. The oil companies' share of the profit oil is around 
20% and the rest accrues to Petrobangla. Increasing the maximum share of cost oil mainly 
influences the recovery pattern of the IOCs’ investments or postpones the income received by 
the GoB. It is a floor and ceiling on the gas prices received by the IOCs and contracts are 
based on a take or pay basis. The IOCs do not pay taxes, while 55% of Petrobangla's gross 
revenues are paid to the government as supplementary duty, and a further 5-10% as income 
tax and dividends. The excise is based on sales price. 
3.2 The Fifth Five-year Plan 1997-2002  
The Plan underlines the importance of power sector reforms. A total of 3319 MW generation 
capacity is planned to be added to the system during the Plan, raising the installed capacity to 
5875MW in FY2001. Only 1389 KW will be provided from the public sector. The rest has to 
be provided by the private sector. Total investment requirement in the power sector during the 
Fifth Plan period is estimated at 117 billion Taka (in 1996/97 constant prices).22 Given the 
enormous challenges of integrating private initiatives in power generation of this magnitude, 
it is remarkable that the Plan acknowledges that neither additional private nor public 
investments are sufficient solutions to the problems faced in the power sector. The Plan 
argues strongly that a reform is needed to complement recent private initiatives. The 
objectives of the proposed power sector reform are to: 
 
· Increase efficiency so as to reduce system loss and attain financial viability; 
· Increase production and distribution of electricity for the vast majority of the population 
in Bangladesh; 
· Improve the quality of the existing power supply system. 
 
There are many reasons for the emphasis put on power sector reform, but the accountability 
issue and the non-sustainable price structure are particularly emphasised. The accountability 
issue is related to the question of corporatisation and unbundling. The Plan supports the idea 
of creating cost and profit centres within existing utilities for commercialisation and 
corporatisation, seen as a preparatory step towards increased private participation. The Plan 
also supports the idea of unbundling existing utilities along functional lines (generation, 
transmission and distribution). Institutions have overlapping responsibilities and therefore 
lack accountability since it is impossible to identify the area of poor performance. For 
instance, the responsibilities for generation, transmission and a large part of distribution are 
vested in the same authority. Regarding the unsustainable price structure, the Plan 
                                                   
22 This is probably an estimate at the lower end. However, this strengthens the argument that the private sector 
needs to be more involved. 
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acknowledges that tariffs are set far too low, on average about 61% of LRMC, but does not 
say much about how to increase tariffs. 
 
Regarding the development of oil, gas and natural resources, the Plan adds little to what has 
already been said in the NEP:  
· Gas should be developed to meet domestic demand for commercial energy; 
· The private sector should be more involved in oil and gas development activities through 
PSA; 
· Gas prices should be adjusted to their economic cost; 
· Exploration and appraisal activities should be intensified; 
· Imported oil should be substituted by natural gas. 
 
The Plan emphasises that an independent regulatory body should be established before the 
unbundling of functional activities and sees the body as a vital element in whose absence the 
entire reform process could be put at risk. 
 
In contrast to the power sector, the Plan hardly discusses the potential of reforms in the gas 
sector. 
3.3 ADP: Energy and social sectors of equal importance 
The Government’s priorities between different sectors can to some extent be revealed from 
their spending data. The energy sector constitutes one of the most important sectors of public 
expenditure. More than 16% of public investment is in the energy sector. For the financial 
year 2001, public investment in the power sector are similar to investment in the education 
sector (about 22 billion Taka or 12.6% of ADP). It is observed that more resources are spent 
in the power sector than in the health and family planning sectors.  
 
Although the GoB invests a sizeable amount in the energy sector, the data reveal a weak but 
downward trend in its relative share.23 On the other hand, the share of the social sectors shows 
a strong and rising trend. From these figures, one may be tempted to conclude that the GoB 
attaches a higher priority to the social sectors compared to the energy sector. It can be argued, 
alternatively, that the GoB rates the potential for quality improvements through sectoral 
reforms in the energy sector more highly than for the social sectors.24  
                                                   
23 According to Helal (1999), the current power crisis is the result of a significant reduction in investment during 
the 1990s compared to the 1980s.  
24 In Wiig (2000) we dispute this by arguing that there is huge scope for quality improvement in the education 
sector. At the same time, the scope for quality improvement is even higher for the power sector. 
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Figure 1: Sectoral allocation of ADP 
 
Source. Government of Bangladesh, different issues of ADP. 
 
3.3.1 The position of donors: ADB and WB  
Donors are financing nine billion Tk or 41% of the ADP budget for the power sector in FY01. 
The main position of the international financial institutions concerning the energy sector is to 
link all their activities to a reform process.25 This process has four characteristics: 
 
· Separation of sector regulation and operation through a regulatory body; 
· Autonomy and commercial orientation of the sector entities; 
· Unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution; 
· Increased private sector participation. 
 
According to both ADB and WB, donor projects should be linked to one or more of these 
functions, but WB is stricter in its conditionalities than ADB.  
 
ADB has, for instance, supported the financing of a Gas Act regulating downstream activities 
in the gas sector.26 Such initiatives are taken as necessary steps in order to separate regulation 
and operation. Similarly, steps have been taken in the power sector through the establishment 
of the Power Cell. The Power Cell also plays an important role with the increasing number of 
IPPs investing in Bangladesh. 
 
ADB  
ADB maintains a strong position in the power sector. ADB only provides loans (at 1% 
interest). Since 1995, all projects have been linked to the reform of the power sector. The 
ADB has played a major role in drawing up the reform assistance strategy of the funding 
agencies and has co-ordinated aid meetings in the power sector several times –most recently 
in 2001.  
 
ADB has financed a number of projects in the power sector including: 
                                                   
25 See section 7.1. 
26 In similar vein, Norad has supported the establishment of a HCU regulating upstream activities in the gas 
sector. 
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· A review of electricity legislation 
· Preparation of a power system master plan 
· Upgrading of the financial management of BPDB and DESA 
· Supported the Meghnagat Project 
· Corporatisation of the Ashuganj power station of BPDB. 
 
From the more comprehensive list of project loans provided in Annex 4, it is revealed that 
ADB has given nearly one billion USD in loans to the power sector since the mid 1970s.  
 
To a question regarding what constitutes the largest challenges in the power sector in the 
future, two main challenges were mentioned by ADB:27  
 
· Sector performance (system losses and tariff restructuring), which is discussed in 
more detail in section 5.5; 
· The fact that BPDB is required to buy from IPPs (see section 7.1) 
 
WB  
WB is extremely clear that they will not support any projects in the power sector unless very 
substantial progress is made in the reform process. As shown in Annex 5, WB has not given 
any concessional loans to the power sector since 1990. With its bad experience in the past, 
WB does not expect that this will change in the future. The Bank will not support new 
investments in BPDB or DESA, but supports accelerated rural electrification. The Bank's 
position can therefore be characterised more as a policy advocate than anything else. 
Measured in terms of financial support, WB plays a minor role. However, WB provides 
guarantees to the IPPs (Haripur power project) and supports the Meghnagat-1 project. WB is 
offering  transmission loan to PGCB (US$ 375 million). 
 
Other donors. Norway, Netherlands, Kuwait and OPEC provide support to REB. 
4 Gas  
Exploration activities have been undertaken in East Bengal since the beginning of this 
century. However, gas production was first started in 1960 at Chattak by Pakistan Petroleum 
Ltd. The first gas produced was used as feedstock to produce urea (fertiliser). At the same 
time Shell began oil exploration, but could only find gas, exploitation of which was not 
commercially viable at the time. The gas in Bangladesh consists of a high level of methanol 
and cannot be used as an input in the petrochemical industry.  
4.1 Actors: Petrobangla and IOCs 
The supply chain in the gas sector can be divided into six phases from exploration of gas to its 
distribution to the final consumer. While transmission and distribution are downstream 
activities, the other four activities are so-called upstream activities. The following table shows 
the different actors involved in each stage.  
                                                   
27 Interview with Ahmed Shamsuddin 25.3 2001 
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Table 1: The supply chain of gas 
Stages Actors involved in 
Bangladesh 
Exploration (logging, seismic 
and dwelling) 
International energy service 
providers and Petrobangla 
Engineering of a production 
facility (platform) 
International energy service 
providers and Petrobangla 
Construction of production 
facilities 
International energy service 
providers and Petrobangla 
Production Petrobangla and international 
oil companies 
Transmission Petrobangla 
Distribution Petrobangla 
 
The main investment costs in the gas sector are related to the construction of the production 
facilities and pipeline transport. The construction of production facilities is out-sourced to 
international firms. The capital cost of gas transport is huge and gas producers therefore need 
long-term contracts with their buyers. Normally, almost 90% of the transport costs are fixed, 
making the transport of gas a natural monopoly. 
 
The gas sector is controlled by MEMR and has been operated by the Bangladesh Oil, Gas and 
Mineral Corporation (BOGMC, later renamed Petrobangla). BOGMC was established under 
the Petroleum Act of 1974 as a state corporation in charge of oil production, the importing, 
refining and marketing of petroleum products, natural gas exploration and gas production and 
delivery. Petrobangla conducts its activity through nine state-owned operating companies. 
These are divided between three gas production companies (see section 4.2) and four gas 
distribution companies (see section 4.3). There are also an oil exploration company (BAPEX) 
and a national gas transmission company (GTCL). Each company has a board of directors 
with members appointed by the government.  
 
The government decides the gas price and exerts substantial control over the activities of 
Petrobangla. A special department in Petrobangla deals with the international oil companies. 
More than 8000 employees are currently employed in Petrobangla. 
 
Two particular characteristics of Petrobangla are noteworthy. First, it is a vertically integrated 
state-owned company. Through its subsidiaries, Petrobangla is involved in all stages from 
exploration to the distribution of gas. The stages or functions in the supply chain are therefore 
vertically integrated or bundled between companies in the same group. Secondly, in addition 
to being a producer, it also plays an important role as a regulator of gas production and in 
policy-making in the sector. In other words, Petrobangla faces substantial conflicts of interest 
arising from its dual role as a producer and a regulator. These characteristics are not atypical 
for national oil companies in developing countries. 
 
In addition to Petrobangla, there are two IOCs (Shell and Unocol) producing gas in 
Bangladesh. With the finalisation of the second bidding round of exploration blocks, other oil 
companies such as Tullow are poised to enter the gas exploration phase. There are also some 
energy-servicing firms such as Schlumberger which have located themselves in Bangladesh in 
order to service the gas production industry.  
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4.2 Production: Steady increase in production  
There are currently around 20 gas fields in Bangladesh of which 12 are currently producing 
gas. The official estimate of recoverable reserves is approximately 12 TCF, but since the 
geological structure in Bangladesh is similar to that found in the Niger delta, there is a strong 
presumption that future prospects of finding a lot more gas are promising (see section 4.6) 
 
Gas production is concentrated in the hands of four suppliers: two international oil companies 
and two national companies. The international oil companies produce a quarter of total 
production. Shell produces 16% of the total while Unocal accounts for the remaining 9%. The 
rest is produced by the two Petrobangla firms, Bangladesh Gas Fields Company Limited and 
Sylhet Gas Fields Limited (55% and 20% respectively). Total production has on average 
increased by 7.1% per year during the last decade and daily production is nearly 900 million 
cubic feet.  
 
Figure 2: Yearly gas production 1990-2000 
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4.3 Transmission and distribution: Concentrated in the eastern part 
There are currently four distribution companies, Bakhrabad (in the south-east), Jalabad (east), 
Titas (north-east, including Dhaka) and Wesgas (west). These four state-owned companies are 
both transmission and distribution companies.  
 
The total size of gas pipelines in Bangladesh is 13000 km. Titas franchises 53% of the 
network (reaching 70% of the domestic customers having access to gas) while Wesgas has 
only 0.5% of the gas network and a similar share of the gas customers. Plans are under way to 
build additional pipelines in the western part of the country.  
 
A fifth transmission company, GTCL, has less than five percent of available network. The 
transmission and distribution networks are skewed and concentrated, particularly along the 
eastern region of the country. A map of gas lines is provided in Annex 3. 
 
Households play significant roles as nodes in the gas network. Out of 982,000 customers 
connected to the gas network, 98.7% are domestic. However, the power sector is by far the 
most important customer for gas. 
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4.4 Demand: Concentration of sales to few buyers in the power sector  
Nearly half of the gas production in Bangladesh is distributed to the power sector as input for 
generation of electricity, while a quarter is used in the fertiliser industry. As of July 2000, 
there were 19 customers from the power sector and 8 customers from the fertiliser sector, 
which together accounted for 75% of Bangladesh’s gas production. The gas market in 
Bangladesh is therefore highly concentrated in production, transmission and distribution, as 
well as along regional lines.  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of yearly gas production by end users. FY99 
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Although households play a minor role (less than 10%) in terms of the quantity of gas sold, 
this is the fastest growing consumer group.  
 
The demand from the fertiliser industry has shown a declining trend during the 1990s with a 
yearly growth rate of 4.4%. The relative importance of the fertiliser industry is therefore 
reducing.  
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Figure 4: Average annual demand growth. 1990-99. % 
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4.5 Prices are discriminatory and do not cover costs 
There is no readily available international price for natural gas, nor can gas be considered a 
perfect substitute for all petroleum products. Market prices of gas therefore differ from 
country to country and between regions depending on supply-demand parameters. 
Nevertheless, there are some guidelines for setting market prices for gas in a country such as 
Bangladesh. These are discussed briefly in this section.  
 
Gas has traditionally not been a widely traded commodity owing to high transport costs. In 
contrast to oil, one needs to develop a market for gas. In order to do so, huge infrastructural 
investments are needed upfront. The investors are reluctant to proceed without securing long- 
term contracts with the buyers. Since gas pipelines are characterised as natural monopolies, an 
extension of the market across national boundaries reduces unit prices (see the discussion in 
section 2). Some regions have developed a regional gas market quite successfully. Northern 
Europe and the US have for instance deregulated their gas markets and developed an 
appropriate infrastructure of pipelines. Pipelines have been constructed in Bangladesh, but the 
network is purely for domestic use. 
  
It is common in many developing countries for gas prices to be set by the government based 
on negotiations between state monopolies. This is also the case in Bangladesh where the 
government sets gas prices, while both the main producer (Petrobangla) and consumer 
(BPDB) are state-owned monopolies. 
 
It is not always possible to apply a fuel oil-equivalent price for gas. For heating and 
electricity generation, oil and gas are substitutable. For transport uses, gas is an expensive 
substitute while the opposite is the case for the production of fertiliser and methanol.  
 
Natural gas is a flexible fuel with many potential uses. Its highest use-value occurs when it 
substitutes for expensive petroleum products such as diesel fuel (for peak power production) 
or kerosene and LPG (for cooking). These uses normally constitute a tiny share of the market 
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while the replacement of fuel oil and coal in the power sector represents the bulk of the 
market. Gas is also used in fertiliser production to replace imports of such goods. In such 
cases, the value of gas depends on the market price of fertiliser. 
 
The economic price or opportunity cost of gas depends on the relative importance of supply 
and demand. Where gas reserves are small and substitute at the margin for some tradable 
products such as oil or coal, the economic price of gas is the equivalent cost of the tradable 
product (as long this value is higher than costs). When gas reserves are very large relative to 
the prospects of increased demand, both domestic and export, then the gas price will be close 
to the production cost of the gas. Gas prices will vary in between these two extremes.28 
 
Insofar as the government does not have any objective of subsidising a particular consumer 
group, prices should at least reflect the costs of providing the group with the goods, including 
the transmission and distribution costs. This is generally not the case in Bangladesh where 
prices are below LRMC. Although no updated data are available, the World Bank undertook 
an assessment of prices and costs in 1998.29 Except for commercial and industrial consumers, 
prices were well below long run marginal costs. Residential customers, power producers and 
the producers of fertilisers were subsidised.30  
 
Although gas prices have increased since then, they are still subsidised by the government. In 
December 1998, the government increased domestic gas prices on average by 15% compared 
to the previous tariff levels set in 1994. However, this was not even enough to compensate for 
the depreciation of the Tk. Despite domestic and international price increases, measured in 
USD the domestic price of gas was 6% lower in 1998 than in 1994. During the last years, the 
prices of gas has increased more than the depreciation of the TK.31 
 
Since prices do not cover costs, this has led to a financially difficult position for Petrobangla, 
which is coping partly through cross subsidies. The main factor here is the low costs of 
production faced by Petrobangla in its older fields (estimated costs are less than a dollar per 
MCF of gas). 
 
 
                                                   
28 The maximum price consumers would be willing to pay for natural gas is referred to as its netback value – it is 
the price of gas at which consumers would be indifferent between using gas and other fuels (assuming other fuel 
prices were exempt from taxes and subsidies). 
29 See also Julius and Mashayekhi (1990:139). 
30 Neither does the price setting take into account that gas is a depletable good and must incur a depletion 
premium (which normally rises over time) referring to the present value of future forgone consumption.  
31 The gas price increased by 15% in 1999 and then again by 15% in September 2000 while the exchange rate 
depreciated yearly by around 5% in the same period.  
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Figure 5: Gas prices and costs by consumer category 
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Source: World Bank (1998). 
 
Prices are also discriminatory between consumers in the same group. For instance, IPPs pay 
twice the price for gas paid by BPDB. Petrobangla is also obliged to buy gas (they only pay 
for the profit gas) from the IOCs on a take or pay basis, and the price of the profit gas is 
higher than the domestic price of gas, escalating Petrobangla's financial distress. 
4.6 Gas reserves are not static 
Estimates of proven gas reserves in the country vary from 12 to 14 TCF. For economic and 
energy security reasons, the official position is to preserve gas reserves to provide for 50 years 
of consumption. At the present rate of domestic consumption, the nation's proven gas reserves 
should last 30 years. However, due to an expected increase in consumption, Petrobangla 
predicts reserves will be exhausted in 17-18 years. Petrobangla expects that Bangladesh's 
demand for natural gas will rise to 1.8 bn cfpd in 2005 and 2.6 bn cfpd in 2010 (from 0.9 bn 
cfpd currently). 
  
The question of reserves is a controversial issue that will be discussed in more depth in 
section 7.2. This section will, however, give a brief background to the different approaches 
towards classifying gas reserves: 
 
· A deterministic classification system distinguishes between proven, probable and possible 
reserves. The proven are only those reserves proved by production or by wells, while 
probable reserves also includes hydrocarbons which are most likely to exist. Possible 
reserves include uncertain reserves. 
 
· A statistical classification system makes an estimate of the probability distribution of the 
reserves. The resource value having an expectation value of 50% is normally used as a 
basis for commercial decisions. 
 
A recent US Geological Survey report on new field discoveries indicated that Bangladesh 
could have 32.1 TCF in gas reserves (with 50% probability). In addition to this, compression, 
3D seismic, and better technology and management in existing fields may according to 
UNOCAL double the proven reserves in Bangladesh. The question of gas reserves is therefore 
disputed and various positions are taken between the official estimate of 11 TCF and 60 TCF 
as presented in the figure below. One thing is clear, however: drilling and seismic activities 
  19 
increase the possibility of expanding the reserves. Currently, Petrobangla is not undertaking 
any drilling activities due to financial constraints, while the IOCs are reluctant because they 
are unsure about the effective market demand for the gas.  
 
Figure 6 :Hydrocarbon Resource Base of Bangladesh 
 
Source: Estimates by UNOCAL. 
 
5 Power 
The power sector in Bangladesh faces severe difficulties and is in the middle of a reform 
process. Power production is mainly based on the transformation of natural gas. 
5.1 Actors: BPDB  
MEMR wholly owns and supervises the three executing agencies: 
· The Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB); 
· The Dhaka Electricity Supply Authority (DESA); 
· The Rural Electrification Board (REB). 
 
BPDB is responsible for all generation and most of the transmission in the country, and for 
distribution in district towns, municipalities, and some rural areas. DESA is responsible for 
distribution in Dhaka. The distribution in rural areas is the responsibility of 67 rural electric 
cooperatives, the Palli Bidyut Samities (PBS), which are organised and monitored by REB 
(see sections 5.3 and 6.1). 
 
As part of the sector reform process, new utilities have been created. The Power Grid 
Company of Bangladesh Ltd (PGCB), the Dhaka Electric Supply Company Ltd (DESCO) as 
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well as private sector independent power producers (IPP) were created in transmission, 
distribution and production respectively. 
 
Figure 7: Organisation of the power sector 
 
The private sector plays a significant and increasing part in power production. IPPs have been 
involved through the adoption of a private power generation policy in 1996. The private 
sector is in the process of being awarding contracts for about 1,800 MW of generating 
capacity on a build-own-operate basis. 
 
A power system master plan has assessed that the demand for electricity will increase by 8% 
per year for the next 10 years. Just to provide necessary investment according to the demand 
estimates from the master plan requires $6.6 billions USD. Bangladesh therefore needs 
private investment or foreign assistance in order to reform and develop the power sector. 
ADB has played a leading role in this process by linking its activities to the reform process 
(see section 3.2.1).  
5.2 Power production: The importance of IPPs 
It is necessary to distinguish between effective capacity and installed capacity in the power 
sector. The two differ due to technical and other losses. The installed capacity in the power 
sector  has increased from 2908 MW in 1994 to 3555 MW in 2000, which represents an 
annual increase of 3.3%. The annual increases in power generation and power for sale during 
the same period were 7.0% and 7.5% respectively. The increase in generation and sales stems 
from the introduction of more efficient combined cycle gas fired power plants by the new 
IPPs.  
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IPPs have approximately 9% of available capacity while rural companies have 0.5%.32 The 
rest is provided by BPDB. There is also some captive capacity in certain industries of 
approximately 400MW, which makes the total available capacity around 4000MW. The 
highest electricity generation in Bangladesh is only 2650MW, indicating inefficiencies in the 
generation of power.  
 
There are  two main reasons for these inefficiencies. First, the generators are for the most part 
based on old vintage technology. Secondly, proper maintenance has not been undertaken. 
Lack of available reserve capacity meant that frequently generators could not be shut-down 
for much needed repair-maintenance work. The problem is compounded by the difficult 
financial situation of BPDB (see section 5.5).33 
 
Figure 8: Power generation (energy for sale). 1994-2000 
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Source: ADB.  
 
IPPs are providing an increasing share of the power supply. In 2004, WB expects that more 
than 50% of the power supply will come from the IPPs. The growth of the IPPs increases 
competition among power producers by gradually decreasing the monopoly of BPDB. Since 
IPPs are paid in foreign currency on a take or pay basis, this will put financial pressure on the 
GoB to adjust market prices of energy towards the costs. If not, the GoB will face a huge 
financial obligation to the IPPs in the future. The IPPs also represent foreign direct capital 
investment and bring new technology and skills into the country. All these factors increase the 
efficiency of the power sector. On the other hand, the IPPs got more favourable treatment 
than domestic firms due to tax exemptions. Guarantees provided by the GoB and international 
                                                   
32 Agreements with the IPPs have been signed for the generation of 1188GWH out of which 578 GWH is 
produced at present.  
33 BPDB supports the recent reform initiatives, particularly that an independent regulatory body set prices. 
BPDB advocates increasing tariffs and that subsidies should be financed by the Government. According to the 
Chaiman, certain incentive schemes have been initiated at the branch level in order reduce costs, but it is unclear 
to us what this means. To a question about the main challenges in the power sector, neither the degree of 
electrification nor the maintenance and quality problem were mentioned. 
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financial institutions and selling prices of energy linked to the gas price reduce the risk faced 
by the IPPs. 
 
Natural gas based plants in the east account for 88% of generated electricity. Except for the 
hydropower station in the east (generating 6%), the remaining generation is based on 
imported liquid fuels in the west.  
5.3 Transmission and distribution  
PGCB was created in 1996 in order to operate and maintain power transmission systems. 
Complete absorption  (from BPDB) of transmission lines was expected by FY2002. However, 
only 20% has been taken over to date.  
 
DESA assumed responsibility for power distribution in Dhaka in 1991. DESCO, a subsidiary 
of DESA was created in 1996 in order to take over the duties of DESA. DESCO has only 
taken over two areas, in Mirpur and Gulshan. It has in the meantime built up arrears 
exceeding Tk. 850 million, which is equivalent to 10 months’ sale. 
 
In a process where IPPs will increasingly play a more important role, the future regulation of 
electricity distribution will be critical. Whether PGCB will do a better job than BPDB is a 
difficult question, partly because BPDB itself is a defaulter and has fallen back on payments 
due to PGCB, and partly because it is not known how prices will be regulated.  
  
Figure 9: Gross sales (MKwH) of electricity. FY 2000 
Source: Power Cell. 
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BPDB is the largest distributor of electricity (about 64% of gross sales) and sells 
approximately 50% of its power to DESA and 20% to REB (categorised as bulk sale in Figure 
9). The rest is sold to domestic consumers (residential and industrial). The Dhaka area 
accounts for more than 50% of electricity sales. During recent years, REB has shown the 
highest growth rates in sales. Just during the last two years, sales have increased by 70%. The 
figures presented below underestimate the importance of REB in the distribution market since 
the sales from BPDB zones and from DESA also include sales to REB. 
 
According to the ADB, REB’s share of the distribution market has increased from 14% in 
1998 to 24% in 2000. It is noteworthy that a large proportion of the electricity distributed by 
the PBSs is sold to industry. 
 
Table 2: Sale of energy by rural electric co-operatives (PBSs) (MKWh) 
 
 Financial 
Year  
1999-2000 
Financial 
Year  
1998-99 
Financial 
Year  
1997-98 
Domestic  973 769 570 
Small commercial 149 119 88 
Irrigation 262 312 192 
Industry  1036 760 565 
Others 35 27 20 
TOTAL 2455 1986 1434 
Source: Power Cell. 
5.4 Demand, prices and costs 
The Power system master plan has assessed the demand for electricity as increasing by 8% 
per year for the next 10 years. The derived demand for gas is assumed to increase by 6.6% 
with a reduction to 5% due to improvement in power plant technologies. 
 
Tariffs have declined in constant terms (measured in US$) from 1995 for all categories of 
customers, particularly for irrigation purposes (see table 3 below). The tariff revisions, made 
according to a formula set by ADB, has not compensated for the depreciation of the Tk. 
 
Commercial and industrial customers pay a significantly higher price than households 
(residential) and agricultural groups (see table 3). Households constitute the largest group of 
customers (accounting for 43% of electricity sales) and are subsidised the most.34  
 
Table 3:Average tariffs by end users. Usc pr KWh 
 1995 1998 2001 
    
Residential 4,11 4,10 3,98 
Commercial  9,23 9,50 8,61 
Industrial 6,11 6,59 6,11 
Agricultural 4,36 3,78 3,24 
Source ADB, 2001. 
                                                   
34 G0B (2000). Statistical Yearbook 1998, table 6.20. 
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Since households constitute a larger part of DESA’s customers than for the other institutions, 
DESA’s average price is lower. Rural consumers pay a significantly higher price for 
electricity than urban consumers and are subsidised less than their urban counterparts. As seen 
for the gas case, power prices do not cover costs while some groups manage to receive 
significant subsidies.  
 
Table 4: Average tariffs by institutions. FY 2000. Tk pr KWh 
BPDB  2.98 
DESA 2.68 
DESCO 2.86 
PBS 3.19 
Weighted average 2.93 
LRMC 3.86 
Source ADB, 2001. 
5.5 Financial performance, system loss and collection ratios  
The quality of the power supply is low. In 1999, only 30 days of uninterrupted supply was 
observed, which increased to 110 days in 2000. Does this indicate a negative trend is turning? 
Unfortunately not. The financial performance of both BPDB and DESA has been very weak, 
and is deteriorating further. BPDB already has high levels of debt to Petrobangla and payment 
obligations to IPPs will increase to 350 million USD in 2005 (from 30 million USD in 1999). 
Without restructuring, it is difficult to see how the power sector will be able to meet its 
liabilities and obligations. The financial performance of BPDB is presented below. 
 
Table 5:BPDB Financial performance 1994-1999 US$ Million 
Fiscal year ending June 30 1994 1997 1999 
Production    
GWh generated 9221 11243 14450 
GWh sold 7448 9446 11352 
Electricity unaccounted for %35 19,2 16,0 21,4 
Auxiliary consumption as % of 
generation 
5,0 4,3 5,0 
Income 
   
Gross revenue 359 435 490 
Total expenditure 336 414 444 
Gross income 23 21 46 
Interest and other 93 50 110 
Net income -70 -29 -64 
Average revenue per unit US c/KWh36 4,82 4,61 4,32 
Rate of return on assets % 0,9 0,8 1,8 
Source: WB (2001:2). 
 
 
 
                                                   
35 GWh sold in % of GWh generated. 
36 Gross revenue/GWh sold. 
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There are several explanations for this weak performance. Inadequate tariffs, as discussed in 
the section above, play an important role in explaining the poor financial performance of 
BPDB. In a situation where both input prices (gas) and tariffs are regulated by the 
government, and tariffs do not cover the cost of production, it is impossible to create a viable 
institution without subsidies from the GoB. BPDB should not be blamed for the wrong tariff 
structure. In fact, BPDB claims that tariffs should be increased and subsidies financed by the 
Government. BPDB is also obliged to provide free electricity to certain government 
institutions and to areas prioritised by the government. BPDB is not compensated for these 
kinds of activities, which are frequently not commercially viable. While REB gets loans at 2% 
interest, BPDB gets loans at commercial rates. BPDB also claims that tax treatment meted out 
is unfavourable compared to the IPPs, which are apparently exempted from import duties and 
taxes. However, BPDB does have a significant advantage from access to gas at a lower rate 
than the IPPs (less than half the price). 
 
While the above factors are outside the control of BPDB, another factor of major importance 
in explaining its bad financial performance is the huge system losses faced in the sector. 
 
Figure 10: System losses of BPDB and DESA. FY93-FY00. Percent.  
 
Source: WB 
 
System losses are high, but appear to be decreasing. BPDB claims that they seek to reduce 
system losses and billing costs by providing incentives for cost reduction at the branch level, 
but we are unaware of the incentives provided.37 REB also has a high system loss, but at the 
same time they have higher collection rates than the other distributors.  
 
                                                   
37 Interview with Mr. M.A. Malek. Chairman of BPDB. 
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Although it is claimed that consumers perceive power as a utility provided free of charge, the 
main defaulters are industries (90%) and governmental institutions (10%).  
 
Figure 11: Collection ratios of BPDB, DESA and the power sector. FY93-FY00. Percent 
 
 
Source: WB. 
 
6. Energy and poverty alleviation 
The relationship between access to commercial energy and poverty alleviation is complex. It 
is essentially viewed in the literature in terms of an energy ladder that moves up from a 
dependence on biomass fuels, largely collected by women and children, to use of fuel-wood, 
kerosene, LPG, piped gas and electricity, in stages, as incomes improve and urbanisation 
expands. Such a representation is somewhat stylised, as in practice multiple energy sources 
are often used even within the same household (e.g. gas for cooking and electricity for 
lighting). The factors that promote consumption of certain fuels or contribute to switching 
from one to another are not well understood. A number of concerns are nevertheless 
noteworthy, and may be grouped into three categories: (a) basic needs, (b) monetary measures 
and (c) non-monetary measures. 
6.1 Basic needs 
Basic needs point to the question of access or potential access and the reliability of a 
particular energy supply regime. The second (monetary measures) relates to income-
expenditure incurred or foregone, time spent in energy related activity, relative prices of 
alternative fuels, capital costs etc. The third category focuses attention on health and 
education aspects, e.g. indoor pollution, impact on leisure, work and study, etc.  
 
A big challenge that faces countries like Bangladesh where access is limited and per capita 
consumption is tiny is to provide connections to households and to ensure that the poor are 
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not left out of this process. Consumption will gradually rise with economic growth and higher 
incomes. 
 
In the case of power, some progress has been made under REB, which has expanded rapidly 
in recent years. Currently, REB claims that it has brought power to 44 percent of villages in 
the country. In terms of population coverage, the figure is around 25 percent. In the case of 
urban areas, power to poor households is constrained by the fact that most tend to live in 
squatter slums and do not have legal title to their premises. This prevents connections from 
being given under existing regulations. 
 
The demand for power remains huge and largely unmet. However, REB connections have 
increased at a faster rate than that envisaged (World Bank, 2000). The financial cost of 
connections and monthly bills are such that even the rural poor can afford them easily. An 
initial deposit equivalent to three months’ consumption is charged for a connection 
(approximately Tk. 180 or just over $3 and the monthly minimum bill is just over a dollar!).38 
Connection fees and charges are uniform for all households, rich or poor, and have been set at 
a rate that enables access for the poor. There are subsidies involved in the rural electrification 
programme, brought about by the fact that returns are low in a situation of low consumer 
density and consumption levels. Thus, even when operating performance is satisfactory new 
schemes require operating subsidies. The problem is addressed through low interest loans 
with a substantial grace period while new networks are financed by Government loans at 2 
percent (which are on-lent to the co-operatives - the PBS - at 3 percent). It needs to be 
mentioned however, that compared to their urban counterparts or neighbours in India, rural 
Bangladeshi consumers receive fewer subsidies, pay their bills more promptly and engage in 
less pilferage (World Bank, 1998). 
 
The REB institutional structure seems efficient and accountable and has demonstrated good 
capacity for rapid expansion and recovery of dues through its PBSs (Palli Bidyut Samities or 
rural co-operatives). The REB is responsible for forming PBSs in rural areas, of which there 
are currently 67. Grid access is being provided to 37400 villages (44%) serving 25 percent of 
the rural population. The performance rating of the PBSs is high and appears to be related to 
greater autonomy, a greater say in the operations of the distributor (REB), absence of 
unionisation amongst employees and a stricter work ethic. The workers also have a closer 
sense of personal and community ownership. Each PBS is run by its own board and is free to 
set its own tariff rates and hiring and paying workers, providing incentive structures and 
training. They are independently responsible for customer services and network management 
but reliant on REB for technical and planning support, including putting in place a system of 
performance targets linked to employee remuneration. They are also encouraged to make 
profits and invest these wisely - mostly in related activities - a decision that depends on their 
independent boards comprising beneficiaries. The PBS approach is an excellent example of a 
co-operative model of community organisation.  
 
Current recovery rates are over 97 percent while the system loss is lower and falling at 8.8 
percent. The Chairman of REB, however, mentioned that in order to meet their target of 
universal coverage by 2020, they would need to expand at a faster rate than currently 
achieved (i.e. from installation of 12000 km per year to closer to 20000 km per year). Some 
PBSs (e.g. PBS-I Dhaka) have done very well and have gone into small-scale power 
                                                   
38 This may be compared to daily agricultural wages of Tk. 60-80 ($1-1.5). Non-agricultural wages are 
somewhat higher. Typical monthly expenditures of poor households were estimated at Tk. 2600 (around $50) for 
a sample of households in rural Bangladesh in 2000 (Murshid 2000). 
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generation, setting up electric pole manufacturing plants and so on. The Government has 
recently allowed the PBS to invest in small power generation plants (up to 30 MW). 
 
Gas connections for domestic and industrial use are mainly provided to consumers in urban-
industrial concentrations. Given the large infrastructural outlays involved in transporting gas, 
it is generally considered economically non-viable to take pipelines to rural areas. It is also 
felt that the rural poor can ill afford the costs of connections and monthly bills and would 
instead prefer to continue to depend on traditional (biomass) sources. It is quite possible, 
however, to connect rural areas adjacent to main gas transmission and distribution networks, 
provided there is sufficient demand.  
 
Gas transmission lines have been constructed with a view to connecting with major centres of 
domestic demand, including possible export demand in India. Distribution lines are mainly 
urban-based, from where the surrounding rural areas could be developed. To date, however, 
gas for rural areas in general and for the poor in particular does not enjoy high priority. 
However, the ADB did undertake a feasibility study to look into the possibility of connecting 
poor households along the actual/proposed ADB-funded transmission lines under Titas 
(TGTDCL) and Wesgas (Murshid, 2000). The study found that there was a lot of interest in 
gas from rural households, and even from poor rural households. From an analysis of incomes 
and expenditures and current levels of indebtedness, the study concluded that most rural 
households would be able to afford gas connections and pay monthly bills. In the case of poor 
rural households, a policy of staggered payment of initial capital costs would go a long way 
towards ensuring access. 
6.2 Impact of access to power 
The poverty impact of commercial energy consumption is notoriously difficult to quantify 
because the poverty and energy relationship is both a cause and an effect. This study has 
attempted to quantify the extent of impacts on poverty indicators. Given the acute 
methodological difficulties associated with such an exercise, these should be viewed carefully 
and critically. Nevertheless, we believe that the direction of impact indicated is likely to be 
valid.  
 
A recent USAID-funded study has tried to address the issue using village-level, household 
survey techniques and comparing households in electrified and non-electrified villages as well 
as electrified and non-electrified households in electrified villages. Some of the major 
findings of the study are reproduced below:39 
 
Average Income. Average income is about 50 percent higher than that of control households 
in non-electrified villages. However, the study attributes 22 percent of the increase directly to 
electrification. 
 
Poverty Rates. The poverty rate in electrified villages was found to be 34 percent (falling to 
27 percent for PBSs with a longer service record) compared to 41 percent in control villages. 
Although electrification has not reduced the gap between the richest and the poorest (those 
with an investable surplus tend to reap larger benefits), the level of the lowest 10 percent 
income group (lowest decile) in electrified villages is much higher than the corresponding 
group in non-electrified villages. 
 
                                                   
39 This section is based on World Bank 2000 and Unnayan Shamunnay 1997. 
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Impact on Irrigation and Rice Production. The recipients identified irrigation benefits as the 
greatest single economic impact of electrification. Farmers prefer electric pumps and in spite 
of the load shedding, 70 percent made the switch from diesel to electricity. Modern Boro 
cultivation has benefited and productivity is estimated to have increased by 8 percent. 
 
Off-Farm Income. Off-farm income has increased by 33 percent compared with control 
villages. 
 
Credit. Electrified households were found to save more and enjoy greater access to credit. 
 
Turnover and Profits. Commercial enterprises benefited from longer working hours (up from 
9 to 14 hours per day) and increased business turnover by 34 percent. They were also found to 
hire more employees and pay higher salaries. 
 
Education. A significant impact on children's education was found - study hours increased by 
two hours a day, and children from electrified households have a higher school attendance 
rate. 
 
Information Access. Information access and social awareness has improved as a result of 
greater access to information; health care appears to have improved. 
 
Women. The condition of women appears to have improved substantially. They enjoy greater 
leisure as well as having more time to engage in activities such as crafts and sewing-
embroidering. Even the incidence of violence is reported to have declined in electrified 
villages! 
6.3 Impact of access to gas 
An ADB-sponsored study pioneered an investigation into the feasibility of connecting poor 
households to the national gas grid, and in this context compared poor connected and non-
connected households as well as non-poor connected and non-connected households. Natural 
gas is an environmentally safe, efficient fuel for household cooking. Access to gas makes a 
big difference to rural and urban as well as to poor and non-poor households. Electricity is 
much more expensive as a cooking fuel and electrical cooking appliances tend to be much 
more expensive as well, so that the gas option is much more desirable. 
 
The study was able to detect a strong desire on the part of rural households to obtain access to 
pipeline gas for cooking. Some better-off households have already switched to CNG available 
in cylinders despite its higher cost and erratic supply. Those who have seen other households 
using gas are particularly keen as they see the benefits immediately, in terms of time saved, 
reduced indoor pollution, cleanliness etc. 
 
A concern of the study was to investigate whether in addition to a desire for gas connections, 
rural households, both poor and non-poor would be in a position to pay for it. It was noted 
that the non-poor have the financial ability to meet the full costs involved, including capital 
and recurrent costs. In the case of the poor, recurrent costs were considered affordable while 
the full capital outlay was likely to pose difficulties. Some kind of financing arrangement 
would be very useful in this context.  
 
The demand-side problems of a rural gas distribution network appear to be negligible. The 
main problems identified were on the supply side, related to lack of transparency regarding 
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costs and charges, complex official procedures and inordinate delays in application 
processing. Even better-off clients with influence find it difficult to cut through the official 
maze to get a connection. 
 
The poor face additional constraints and have certain specific characteristics that make it more 
difficult for them to benefit. A major problem relates to the absence of land titles, which is a 
necessary pre-condition for a connection (per existing rules).  
 
The viability of this option was tested through an examination of the current debt burden of 
poor connected and non-connected households. We can see from the table 6 that the average 
debt burden (debt servicing ratio) of those poor households who are currently indebted is 
between 25-35 percent with an average indebtedness level of between Tk.5500-7400. This 
should be compared with the capital outlay of around Tk. 7400 needed for a connection.40 On 
the other hand, the average debt burden of all poor households (i.e. indebted or not) is around 
10.5 percent. This suggests that there is considerable scope for a large number of poor 
households, especially those who are not excessively indebted, to finance their capital costs, 
e.g. through micro-credit. A figure of around 50 percent, under a subsidy scheme, would be 
well within reach of most.  
 
The evidence on impact is somewhat more circumspect. However, it was clear that once 
connected, households never went back to the use of traditional fuels, suggesting a huge 
impact on women and children in terms of their time-use patterns (e.g. related to collection 
and processing of biomass fuels). 
 
Women's time saved was spent primarily on "housework" and seems to indicate a lessening 
burden, especially during the difficult rainy season when fuel collection difficulties are 
compounded by lack of dry fuel-wood. The frequent use of damp fuel-wood results in high 
smoke pollution levels, poor cooking efficiency and long hours in the kitchen. No direct 
income effects on women could be discovered.  
 
The main conclusion to be derived from this discussion is that rural effective demand (and 
desire) for both power and gas is very high. In the case of power, current connection fees and 
minimum monthly charges are small enough to encourage even poor households to switch to 
electricity. Gas connections desired primarily for household cooking are somewhat more 
expensive. The non-poor, it would appear, are able to afford connections at existing rates 
while the poor are likely to be in need of partial subsidies. The main effort that is needed is on 
the supply side so that appropriate rural distribution networks can be put in place to meet the 
huge potential demand. 
 
                                                   
40 Murshid (2000). 
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Table 6:Debt Burden of Poor Households 
 Connected poor Non-connected poor 
Credit outstanding 
  Per indebted hh 
 
  Average - all hh 
 
Repayment burden per month 
 Per indebted hh 
 
 Average - all hh 
 
Average monthly exp-Tk 
 
Debt burden (indebted) 
 
Debt burden (all hh) 
  
 
8744 
 
4080 
 
 
807 
 
377 
 
2285 
 
35% 
 
16.5% 
 
 
5471 
 
2240 
 
 
505 
 
207 
 
1976 
 
25.5% 
 
10.5% 
 
Source: Murshid  (2000). 
 
7. The political economy of energy policy 
A review of the energy sector would be incomplete without reference to the political economy 
aspects of energy policy. This is, in many ways, crucial to an understanding of the nature and 
pace of reforms and the potential for their successful execution. The purpose of this section is 
to bring the political economy aspects explicitly on board for this review. 
 
The response to the complex problems faced by the energy sector has been to propose 
unbundling, corporatisation, privatisation, and the creation of an independent regulatory body, 
for both gas and power (see section 3.1).41 However, implementation of the reforms has been 
slow because of stiff resistance from the bureaucracy, the officials of the concerned agencies 
(e.g. Petrobangla and PDB) and their trade unions. The Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources has, in principle, accepted the reforms but feels that there is room for differences of 
opinion with regard to the pace and speed of implementation. There is also a certain 
reluctance on the part of the Ministry to devolve power entirely to an independent regulatory 
body, due in part to a long history of intervention in the sector. 
 
Civil society and the political parties are not very vocal about the question of reform. There is, 
however, a great deal of concern about the presence of powerful IOCs in the country and 
whether Bangladesh is able to safeguard its national interests and ensure negotiation of an 
equitable and fair contract. The memory of a gas-field explosion in Sylhet (Magurchara) is 
fresh in people's minds. No compensation was paid by the IOC operator concerned, despite 
the considerable damage caused, due to contractual weaknesses. Similarly, there are concerns 
that moves taken by IOCs to encourage exports of natural gas to India by pipeline may not be 
in Bangladesh's best economic and strategic interest, and must thus be handled carefully. 
                                                   
41 Energy sector reforms by definition include acts to minimise transmission and distribution losses, metering the 
consumers, removing political interference in running the utilities etc. - measures that would be expected to 
make the energy authorities financially viable, thereby stimulating further investment in the sector. 
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The recent opening up of the power sector to foreign independent power producers has been 
hailed as an important step towards the goal of accelerating power generation capacity in the 
country. Investor response has been excellent in the face of low risks and high, guaranteed 
returns. There remains a nagging question, however, regarding the country's ability to muster 
the foreign currency resources that will be needed to pay for electricity purchased from the 
IPPs. 
 
A distinction between IPPs investing in barge-mounted operations and those investing in 
higher capacity combined cycle plants needs to be made. The former have come in for severe 
criticism because of their high cost and the long-term commitment (15 years) for a short-term 
need. For example, at 80 percent plant factor, cost ($ per kWh) of barge-mounted power is 
between $0.052 to $0.069 compared to alternative supply sources costing $0.0217 (World 
Bank, 1998). It is therefore not surprising that the fast-track barge-mounted option has come 
in for severe criticism from the press and civil society. 
7.1 The power sector: The question of reform 
The power sector in Bangladesh is beset with huge management and institutional problems, as 
revealed in section 5. The main agency in charge of power is the BPDB that has traditionally 
enjoyed responsibility for power generation, transmission and distribution. Over the years, 
and mainly under concerted donor pressure, BPDB agreed to undertake certain reforms. These 
include the formation of a separate distribution company (DESA) for power distribution in 
Dhaka, the creation of DESCO in 1996 as a subsidiary of DESA, and the setting up of the 
Power Grid Company (PGCB) in 1996 to operate and maintain the transmission system. In 
other words, the reforms have been taking place slowly, mainly to meet donor 
conditionalities.42 
 
This is borne out by the fact that DESA, DESCO and PGCB have been slow to act, often 
prevented from making more rapid progress because of their inability to resolve problems 
related to the transfer of assets and manpower to these newly established entities. Thus each 
step of the way has been subject to long, protracted negotiations, both within the different 
government agencies and with donors, causing lengthy delays. Thus, the Energy Donor's 
Meeting of March 2001 was constrained to point out: 
 
Reforms have been largely donor-driven, without a detailed road map which has the broad support of the 
Government and the industry.43 The reforms got little, if any support at the political level. 
 
It was therefore not surprising that progress was frustratingly slow. The solution favoured by 
most donors is corporatisation, followed by privatisation of the distribution system. For 
example, it is argued, "unless a new strategy is adopted for the restructuring/corporatization 
process of the power sector, the process will continue at a slow pace, leading to uncertain 
outcomes at an uncertain date in the future."44  
                                                   
42 The reform process has been under discussion since the mid 1980s. One of its first achievements was the 
creation of DESA as a separate distribution agency for power in Dhaka city. 
43 The Government-donor relationship is complex, to say the least. The following quote from an ex-Chairman of 
BPDB is instructive: "The Government is determined to support the power sector. However, major donors have 
put in strict conditionalities for providing support to the development of the sector. Recently the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank, in an unprecedented move, decided to make a joint policy prescription for the 
power sector..." The Restructuring of the Power Sector, Report No. 26, Centre for Policy Dialogue, p.8. 
44 Briefing Paper, Bangladesh Energy Sector Coordination Meeting, March 19, 2001 p.3. 
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The crucial question here is why are the reforms so difficult to implement? The answers are 
complex, but probably involve the following elements detailed below.  
 
The Government knows it is inefficient and that the huge losses being sustained by BPDB and 
its subsidiaries cannot be borne indefinitely. While it would like to improve matters (i.e. to 
raise efficiency) it is very unwilling to do so at the expense of losing control over such a 
critical sector. A solution that provides the Government with enough regulatory power but at 
the same time leaves enough incentives to improve efficiency has yet to be devised, or even 
considered possible. A basic element relates to the question of operational independence. 
BPDB managers have little decision-making authority, e.g. in terms of operating a generation 
unit. Such lack of independence prevents functional efficiency (CPD 2000). Other countries 
in the region, especially Malaysia, Thailand and India, have given much greater independence 
to their power authorities, including commercial independence, which probably accounts for 
their relative success. 
 
A pre-requisite appears to be a strong government that is able to take the risk of reducing the 
workforce, providing adequate staff salaries and benefits for the remaining workers, and 
demonstrating a genuine commitment to deregulate. These are not easy tasks to perform, as 
highlighted by the painfully slow reforms in other sectors of the economy, especially the 
nationalised industry sector.45  
 
The current state of inaction and lethargy, punctuated by occasional knee-jerk responses made 
at donor insistence, receives support from a host of vested interest groups deriving benefits 
from such a state of affairs in BPDB. These include the trade union leaders and their 
members, officials of BPDB and subsidiaries, and a large network of contractors, engineers, 
suppliers and cadres of political parties and semi-criminal elements - all of whom have large 
stakes involved. At stake are public domain resources that can be appropriated, i.e. contracts 
for construction, equipment supply, deals with rich consumers wishing to lower their bills, 
inappropriate connections at a price, and so on.46 Frequently, these "stakeholders" cut across 
party lines, preventing any meaningful opposition from different political parties. Poor 
consumers have no clout and are at the mercy of petty (and not so petty) officials of BPDB. 
More influential or better-off consumers, including institutional consumers, find it easier and 
much more lucrative to enter into informal negotiations with workers, trade union leaders or 
corrupt officials to evade paying bills - hence there is no effort on their part to support the 
reforms. 
 
The most important institutional problem underlying the sector relates to the low pay levels, 
morale and self-esteem of public sector employees. This is a well-known problem but little 
has been done to remove this fundamental flaw.47 The main impact of privatisation will 
precisely be here - employees will get a living wage and can be made more accountable. 
Without addressing this basic incentive problem in public utilities and services, no amount of 
reform will succeed - barring complete transfer of authority to another (private) entity.  
                                                   
45 Over the last five years the Privatization Board has been able successfully to denationalise only one industrial 
unit. 
46 Mr. Siddiqui, ex-Chairman of BPDB, identified "notorious trade unionism and political influence" as the most 
important reason for the poor position of the sector. He also pointed out that in terms of non-payment of bills, the 
worst offenders are from industry - a situation resulting in part from corruption amongst "a certain section of 
BPDB" (see CPD 2000, p.7).  
47 The poor calibre and low morale that has beset the public administration system of Bangladesh is well 
documented - see Ahmed (2001). 
  34 
 
That the public sector can deliver has been demonstrated by a number of agencies – the Rural 
Electrification Board and the Local Government Engineering Department, to name just two. 
Thus it is likely that corporatisation combined with an appropriate incentive and management 
structure can rescue public sector agencies like BPDB. Such an approach is likely to be much 
more palatable to a Government deeply worried about losing control. This would also allay 
fears among a section of civil society of foreign dominance over a basic, strategic good. 
Given the dominant ideology amongst development partners, such innovative approaches 
have largely been missing and need careful rethinking. The threat from unionised workers is 
also very real and a genuine constraint to reform. Higher salaries will attract better quality 
staff and improve motivation, morale and efficiency, but it will also be necessary to weed out 
corrupt, inefficient staff. This is the challenge that the Government and the development 
partners must jointly address. 
7.2 The gas sector: The question of exports  
The main controversy surrounding the gas sector, however, relates to the optimal use of 
Bangladesh's 'only natural resource'. The IOCs are keen to export gas to India by pipeline 
while local opinion varies considerably.48 The political and civil society views on this vexing 
matter are discussed below, under three heads: (a) the question of gas exports, (b) gas pipeline 
to India, and (c) gas production sharing.49 
7.2.1 Export of gas 
There is increasing support in Bangladesh for an export-oriented growth strategy to generate 
employment and improve access to technology and foreign investment. An important sector 
in this context is foreign investment in and possible exports of natural gas. There is, however, 
a popular perception that gas reserves are finite and exhaustible, and that there are a number 
of options available, including domestic consumption. For this and other reasons, there is a 
distinct reluctance/conservatism with regard to gas exports from Bangladesh. The reasons 
given by leading members of civil and political society, as well as ordinary citizens, touch 
upon economic and, more importantly, political and strategic grounds.  
 
A frequent question raised refers to the reliability of the estimate of gas reserves. It is felt that 
not enough data is available on this critical aspect to allow any meaningful decisions to be 
reached. There is a widely held perception that entities that are likely to have access to the 
relevant data are not sharing it with the government or the public. There is an uneasy feeling 
that the government has inadequate information and should take steps to develop its own 
capability to enable it to make an independent assessment of the reserve position.  
 
Other concerns have also been flagged. There is a need for an assessment of domestic energy 
requirements under alternative development scenarios. There is a view that even if such 
estimates/studies exist, there has been inadequate discussion and dissemination of their 
findings. On the basis of domestic requirements a strategic plan should therefore be chalked 
out in terms of alternative options - conversion to power, CNG, LNG or fertiliser etc. It is felt 
                                                   
48 Seven distinct positions have been identified with respect to the question of gas exports - see Hossain, J. 
(2001). 
49 This part is based on interviews conducted by one of the authors in the context of another study (Sirius 1998) 
as well as on dialogue and discussion papers emanating from CPD. 
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that once supply and demand parameters have been solidly established, the surplus, if any, 
could be exported.50 
 
There is a clear, albeit implicit, notion that it is preferable to use the nation's gas reserves 
directly for its own development. Thus, comments like "we should not squander our natural 
resources" are frequently made. It is likely that these views are predicated upon anxieties 
about the ability of Bangladesh to secure fair, advantageous terms in negotiations with 
powerful foreign entities. Moreover, there is the implied fear of India, the obvious customer 
for natural gas exports, which is deemed to be a powerful neighbour that tends to pursue a 
policy of regional dominance over the smaller countries in the region. Thus a number of 
distinct views have emerged about the desirability of exports: 
 
The official position of the Government of Bangladesh is that exports may only be undertaken 
after ensuring that the country is able to meet domestic gas demand for the next fifty years. 
This position reflects the popular as well as the political mood in the country. The difficulty 
of this position is that much depends on an accurate estimate of proven gas reserves as well as 
establishing demand parameters with some degree of accuracy - both extremely difficult 
tasks.51 
 
The ADB seems to be striking a moderate stance and advocates limited exports to bordering 
regions of India. This position finds some support amongst some observers in the local 
academic community. 
 
The IOCs and the World Bank advocate substantial gas exports by pipeline to India, mainly to 
the New Delhi market. Thus some IOCs (e.g UNOCAL), along with the World Bank and a 
small section of the academic community, support gas exports of up to 3.5 TCF. Others like 
Shell, with support from the World Bank, would like to export up to 7 TCF. 
 
Most opposition political parties, including the Left, Jamaat-e-Islami and the BNP, appear to 
be entirely opposed to exports through a pipeline. This position is privately supported by 
many adherents of the ruling party as well. The preponderant view is that the gas should be 
used for local consumption, e.g. for power generation and fertiliser production, or in the 
manufacture of gas-based products. A slight deviation from this position is taken by some 
who feel that exports may be permitted only after value-addition, e.g. as LNG.52 
  
Another view that has found some favour among some foreign and local academics is to have 
a five-year moratorium on exports, presumably to give adequate time to the government to 
explore all the alternatives carefully before a decision is reached.53 
 
Public opinion regarding gas exports may have softened over the years to some extent - but 
almost certainly there remains sizeable opposition to large-scale exports. Thus, the limited 
                                                   
50 This notion of an "available surplus" featured prominently in most of the discussions and was repeatedly put 
forward as a key decision variable. 
51 See the discussions in section 4.6. The best possible estimates will still remain good guesses, which may not 
satisfy domestic critics. Thus, reserve estimates will become more reliable as explorations and development take 
place - putting us into a catch 22 situation. 
52 This view is shared amongst others by Professor N. Islam of Bangladesh University of Engineering and 
Technology (see Hossain 2001). In practice, this is not a helpful option as LNG exports appear not to be 
economically viable. 
53 Conference on gas exports organized by IUBAT, Dhaka, and Simon Fraser University, Canada, 2001 (see 
Jaccard et al, 2001). 
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export argument could be sold if adequacy of reserves could be convincingly demonstrated. In 
general, exporting after value-addition is much less controversial, so a serious effort needs to 
be made to examine the option of gas-based power exports. 
7.2.2  The pipeline option 
There is a feeling that the structure of the PSA, under which gas has to be purchased in US 
dollars and, according to many observers, at a high price, and the discovery of large gas fields 
imply that Bangladesh will be forced into a situation where there may be no option but to 
export - even if only to pay the IOCs for gas off-takes. There is increasing pressure on 
Bangladesh, not only from IOCs but also from powerful donor agencies and foreign 
governments, notably the US, to agree to exports - preferably pipeline exports.54 The 
motivations are clear. It may also be perfectly correct that this would be a win-win situation 
for all concerned - however, as matters currently stand this is not self-evident to a large 
number of people.  
 
Quite apart from the economics of gas pipelines, which may well be attractive, there are 
political-strategic considerations that may be important. They have to do with broader Indo-
Bangla relations, including resolution of outstanding border disputes, access to Indian markets 
for Bangladeshi products, which India has repeatedly promised but never delivered, and 
vague fears of Indian domination - fears that cloud the entire debate as India is perceived with 
suspicion. There is the added problem of insurgency in India's Northeast, close to 
Bangladesh's north-eastern and eastern borders, and suggestions that a pipeline to mainland 
India could invite attacks on it. In the same vein, it is debated whether India may send in its 
army to protect access to a strategic good like gas if supplies become threatened. The main 
point is that unless Indo-Bangla trust improves, the potential for reaping the benefits of 
regional co-operation will remain small, even in the face of sizeable economic benefits. The 
fact that at least one major political party has made a career out of an anti-Indian stance does 
not help matters.55 
7.2.3 Production sharing contracts 
A major concern that evoked much comment relates to PSCs and the relationship between the 
IOCs and their local agents. Many expressed an apprehension that perhaps these contracts 
were being signed in haste and in a situation of inadequate transparency. There was a strong 
feeling that the people had a right to know about the details of these contracts, although some 
acknowledged that it was not practicable, or even desirable, to keep the public informed about 
the painstaking and complex process of negotiations on a day to day basis. 
 
A consistent and pervasive theme relates to suspicion of sell-outs to IOCs. Thus some 
opposition leaders even suggested that if they come to power and find that unfair contracts 
have been awarded, they reserved the right to revoke them. The question of local agents and 
                                                   
54 There has been a spate of diplomatic activity initiated by the US State Department and intended to persuade 
Bangladesh to change its mind about exports of gas, culminating in President Clinton's brief visit to Bangladesh 
last year. In a recent press conference, the US ambassador to Bangladesh, Mary Ann-Peters, stated that 
irrespective of which party forms the next Government in Bangladesh, she hopes that it will take a bold and 
appropriate decision about gas utilisation! (BBC Bangla broadcast monitored on 2 May, 19:45 GMT). 
55 The main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), was founded by General Zia, an ex- 
freedom fighter in 1977. He introduced the concept of Bangladeshi nationalism as opposed to Bengali 
nationalism. Bangladesh was founded on the basis of the latter. Thus, Bangladeshi nationalism was seen as a 
move away from secularism and an attempt to bring pro-Islamic ideology back in Bangladesh. The BNP has also 
taken a sharp anti-Indian (and implicitly) pro-Pakistani stance ever since.  
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their role was also raised. It was asked why these agents were recruited by the IOCs in the 
first place, even before a contract was drawn up. This leads to unnecessary lobbying and 
attempts to influence the course of negotiations and to gain favours. Indeed, often the proteges 
of powerful ministers operate as local agents, a situation that serves to heighten unease and 
fears of a sell-out. 
 
There was a concern about monopolistic tendencies emerging in the gas market. Most argued 
that more rather than fewer companies should be awarded contracts. There was also a view 
that the presence of US companies might act as a deterrent to potential Indian intentions of 
asserting control over Bangladeshi gas resources. Generally, it was felt that Bangladesh could 
engage in effective negotiations given the will and perhaps the disposition to seek expert help 
when needed.56  
 
At a more tactical level, there is a school of thought that believes in accelerating the whole 
process in order to cash in on the excellent response from international IOCs. Inability to do 
so may mean that these companies will go away to other areas. The acute poverty in 
Bangladesh also indicates that the country needs to act fast to take appropriate action. As 
against this, there is the feeling that the gas wealth could be squandered (the Nigeria 
syndrome), especially in the absence of a clear plan about how to invest the profits once they 
begin to accumulate. As long as there is a clear lack of strategy in this regard it may be better 
to keep the gas resources under the ground. The middle opinion favours a cautious approach 
whereby Bangladesh enters into contractual negotiations on the basis of equitable distribution 
of risks and benefits while at the same time developing the capacity to absorb and manage a 
large addition to its capital flows. 
 
The media interest in the gas sector has ensured a steady, sometimes erroneous stream of 
information on virtually all aspects of gas sector development. Moreover, a series of seminars, 
workshops and dialogues, widely reported in the media, have taken place in the country and 
have helped to generate a more informed debate. Thus, the process of discussion and 
exchange across academia, journalists, civil society, policy-makers and the IOCs continues to 
occur - a trend that can only be good for transparency and public awareness regarding the 
critical issues. Compared to two or three years ago, distinct progress has been made towards 
arriving at an operational consensus, although the level of effort will need to be maintained to 
arrive ultimately at a solution. Further work in the form of solid technical studies would 
certainly be very useful. 
8. Conclusion  
The public utilities in the energy sector in Bangladesh are in a deep financial crisis, partly due 
to an inappropriate tariff structure, problems with maintenance, system loss and low 
collection rates. At the same time, consumers’ access to electricity and gas is constrained, 
while load shedding reduces the quality of the power supply.  
 
The GoB is well aware of these problems, but still adopts a go-slow policy regarding the 
reform process. Regarding production, the GoB has opened up the market to IOCs and IPPs. 
Tax policy towards multinationals seems quite attractive and to discriminate against domestic 
firms.  
                                                   
56 One of the authors recalls a comment made by a senior official with a multilateral agency to the effect that 
they were ready to provide the necessary expertise to Bangladesh in conducting these negotiations but their 
offers were not taken up.  
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The reform progress in transmission and distribution has been far from successful. 
Liberalisation of production without distribution may lead BPDB and Petrobangla into an 
even more difficult financial situation than before the reform process started, since contracts 
with the multinationals are based on a take or pay principle.  
 
The donor response, at least from ADB and WB, to the slow reform process is to link their aid 
programmes to the current reform processes. The establishment of an independent regulatory 
body is of high priority. 
 
Several political reasons for the slow implementation of the reform process and the 
‘nationalistic’ position regarding the use of the gas reserves are discussed. We argue that the 
implementation of reforms have been slow because of stiff resistance from the bureaucracy, 
the officials of the concerned agencies and the trade unions.  
 
The debate about the use of gas is political (whether or not to trade with India) more than 
economic (the opportunity costs of domestic use in terms of lack of export revenue and 
transfers of technology). Energy, like other commodities, is to some extent a tradeable good, 
at least in a regional context. The energy policy lacks a regional economic perspective. 
 
In contrast to many other developing countries facing the same types of problem with their 
public utilities, Bangladesh is in the favourable position that nature has provided the country 
with a significant volume of hydrocarbons in terms of gas. Although the size of these reserves 
is disputed, the gas represents an additional energy supply in Bangladesh as well as for the 
whole region.  
 
We have argued that the main challenges for Bangladesh in the energy sector are to provide 
electricity to domestic industry and households and to broaden access to natural gas. Although 
the theoretical and empirical relationship between access to energy and poverty is unclear, 
different empirical studies from the Bangladeshi context, referred to in this report, 
demonstrate that a positive relationship exists. Questions have also been raised whether the 
poor can afford commercial energy. In Bangladesh it seems like they can and that they are 
willing to pay for it, but the supply is constrained.  
 
Three cost elements are involved in the power supply: a fixed cost, a variable cost and a 
transaction cost. Regarding the fixed element, the population density in rural Bangladesh is 
significantly higher than in most other countries. Since the transmission of electricity and gas 
establishes natural monopolies with high fixed costs, the high population density in the rural 
areas reduces unit costs, making it less costly for the power company to serve the poor. 
Regarding the variable costs, these can be reduced by limiting customers’ energy use to 
particular purposes (electricity for lightning) or scale (e.g. a few lamps for a few hours per 
day). Regarding the transaction costs, REB’s institutional structure seems efficient and 
accountable and has demonstrated excellent capacity for rapid expansion and recovery of 
dues. 
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Annex 1 a: Terms of Reference 
 
 
7 March 2001 
 
 
A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN THE ENERGY 
SECTOR OF BANGLADESH 
A background study commissioned in accordance with the agreement between NORAD 
and CMI/NCG to strengthen the country-specific knowledge base 
 
 
1 BACKGROUND  
This study is commissioned with reference to contract entered with CMI/NCG on 22.4.1999 
specifying the objectives of a 2-year programme for strengthening the country-specific 
knowledge base of NORAD and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The contract envisaged the 
development of an annual country report with two main elements; firstly, an updating of and 
commentary to recent development trends, and secondly, a more thematically focused part of 
particular interest for Norwegian development assistance.  
 
In consultation with CMI, in the case of Bangladesh, it has been agreed to focus the work of 
year 2 exclusively on the thematic part, and address development trends in the energy sector. 
2 OBJECTIVES  
The objective of this assignment is to inform key decision-makers of Norwegian development 
assistance to Bangladesh on the development prospects of the commercial energy sector in 
Bangladesh. The study shall highlight policy challenges in order to enable the growth of a 
domestic industry, and ensuring the sector’s contribution to poverty reduction. 
 
The assignment shall result in: 
- A report not exceeding 30 pages, excluding appendices 
- Seminar presentations in Dhaka of preliminary findings, and in Oslo based on 
the final report. 
3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This is an explorative study carried out within a limited resource frame, and it is not possible 
to outline in detail the content of the report. It envisaged that the team, upon completion of the 
fact finding mission in Bangladesh, will present to Norad a proposed outline of the report. 
 
It is envisaged that the report might include: 
- An overview of the current political, economic and legislative context and the structure of 
the energy sector.  
- An overview of the key actors in the sector – domestic as well as international. This will 
include activities of transnational corporations as well as the main donor agencies and 
international finance institutions. 
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- A formulation of possible development scenarios for the sector in a 5-10 years 
perspective. 
- A discussion on the prospects of enhancing the potential of developments in this sector 
contributing to poverty reduction. This may relate to revenue issues, the potential for 
direct and indirect creation of employment, and equitable distribution of energy. 
 
The study will  contribute important background information to the formulation of mandates 
for subsequent studies or missions preparating for a possible Norwegian involvement in the 
sector.  
4 APPROACH  
4.1 Methods 
The study will make use of three main sources of information: 
- Research reports of relevance 
- Recent policy related reports and commissioned reports 
- Interviews with key stakeholders 
4.2 Duration, reporting, time schedule and resources 
The study should be carried out in the course of a two-month period, with the Draft Final 
Report being submitted to NORAD by 10 May 2001, provided the work is commissioned at 
the latest by end-February. 
 
The work will involve two researchers, one from CMI – Dr. Arne Wiig, and one from BIDS – 
Dr. K.A.S. Murshid. 
 
The work will be carried out within the following work plan and resource frame: 
 
 Wiig Murshid 
Preperation of the study, including meeting in Oslo in 
January (4 days) 
4/5 - 
Collection/review of relevant literature (3 days) 3/5 1 
Fieldwork in Bangladesh, incl. Travel and drafting the 
report. During weeks 12-13-14. 
3 3 
Editing of Draft Final Report 8/5 1 
Comments on Report By NORAD 
Finalising Report and presentation in Oslo  1  
Total in person-weeks 7  5 
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Annex 1b: List of persons interviewed  
Name Date Institution E-mail Position 
 
Berg, Erik 
21.3 Norad erik.berg@dac.norad.no Councillor 
Chapman, 
Peter 
 
24.3 Shell Peter.chapman@sbed.shell.com Gas and 
power 
manager 
Shamsuddin, 
A.H.M 
25.3 Unocol ashamsuddin@unocol.com Chief 
geologist 
Barber, Scott  Unocol sbarber@unocol.com President and 
managing 
director 
Shamsuddin, 
Ahmed 
25.3 ADB sahmed@adb.org Head energy 
Kicker, Scott 26.3 AES skicker@aesc.com  
Shamsuddin, 
A.K.M 
26.3 MEM 
Hydrocarbonunit 
heu@bttb.net.bd Director, 
Hydrocarbon 
unit 
Elahi, Raihan 27.3 WB relahi@worldbank.org Consultant 
Iqbal, Md 27.3 WB miqbal@worldbank.org Energy 
specialist 
Hussain, 
Mosharraf Md 
28.3 Petrobangla petchair@dotbd.com Chairman 
Rahman, 
Mizanur  
29.3 Ministry of 
Energy and 
Mineral 
Resources 
 Joint Secretary 
Malek, M.A 29.3 Bangladesh 
Power 
Development 
Board 
chbpdb@bol-online.com Chairman 
Huq, M. 
Moinul 
5.4 Bapex geobapex@bangla.net General 
mangager, 
exploration 
Rahman, 
K.M. Faizur 
5.4 Power Cell dgpcmemr@citecho.net Director 
General 
Kabir, A.S.M. 
Alamgir 
5.4 Power Cell dgpcmemr@citechco.net Director, 
tariffs 
Ahmed, 
Mesbah Uddin 
5.4 Rural 
Electrification 
Board 
chairman@citechco.net Chairman 
Abdullah, 
Syed Abu 
5.4 
 
Rural 
Electrification 
Board 
rebpp@citecho.net Director, 
Programme 
Planning 
Islam, Md. 
Tauhidul 
 
5.4 PBS asifmt@bttb.net Member PBS 
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Annex 2: Key Energy Indicators in South Asia  
 
 B’desh India Nepal Pak Sri Lanka S. Asia E. Asia 
Commercial energy use 
per cap (kgoe, 1997) 
 
Commercial energy 
prod. (‘000 mtoe, 1997) 
 
Commercial energy 
use, 1997 (‘000 mtoe) 
 
Net oil imports 
(as % commercial 
energy use) 
 
GDP per unit of energy 
use (ppp $ per kgoe, 
1997)57 
 
Traditional fuel use58 
(% of total energy) 
 
Carbon dioxide 
emission per capita 
MT, 1996 
 
197 
 
 
 
21894 
 
 
24327 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
6.8 
 
 
43.3 
 
 
0.19 
 
479 
 
 
 
404503 
 
 
461032 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
4.2 
 
 
21.2 
 
 
1.05 
321 
 
 
 
6559 
 
 
7160 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
3.7 
 
 
90.9 
 
 
0.07 
442 
 
 
 
42048 
 
 
56818 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
3.9 
 
 
17.3 
 
 
0.75 
386 
 
 
 
4345 
 
 
7159 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
7.6 
 
 
48 
 
 
0.39 
443 
 
 
 
479349 
 
 
556496 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
23 
 
 
0.9 
942 
 
 
 
1535331 
 
 
1647182 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
2.66 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2000 CD Rom, World Bank 
 
                                                   
57 This measure is the inverse of the energy intensities discussed in section 2.  
58 The rest is commercial energy. 
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Annex 4: Past ADB loans to the power sector 
 
 
Project Name Loan No. Original Loan US$
Million
Board
West Zone Power 141 9.25 10/17/73
West Zone Power 142 1.20 10/17/73
West Zone Power- Supplementary 212 4.55 12/19/74
Chittagong Power 325 27.75 12/9/77
Power System Rehabilitation & Expansion 523 26.50 09/22/81
Ashuganj Project 587 35.00 10/21/82
Power Transmission a Distribution 636 82.00 09/13/83
Sixth Power (Sector Loan) 683 120.00 06/14/84
Seventh Power 151 40.50 10/31/85
Eighth Power 963 165.00 07/11/89
Rural Electrification 1356 50.00 05/30/95
Ninth Power Project 1505 134.4 11/96
Dhaka Power System Upgrade Project 151 12/99
TOTAL 853.15
Source: ADB- Dhaka Power System Upgrade Project
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Annex 5: Past IDA credits to the power sector 
 
Project Name Credit No. Total  
Credit 
Amount 
Board 
Greater Khulna Power 934-0 28.0 6/14/79 
Distribution    
Ashuganj Thermal Power 1254-0 87.5 6/1/82 
Rural Electrification Rural 1262-0 39.9 6/15/82 
Electrification [Supplemental] 1504-3 8.0 6/19/84 
2"d Rural Electrification 1633-0 61.6 11/12/85 
Power Transmission and 1648-0 43.4 1/14/86 
Distribution    
Power Distribution 116 Towns) 2016-0 87.0 5/16/89 
31d Rural Electrification 2129-0 105.0 5/1/90 
  460.4  
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